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Abstract 
The dissertation discusses the potential roles of trade and food reserve cooperation among 
countries in pursuing more stable food prices, with a special focus on Indonesia. The study starts 
by analyzing food price movements in Indonesia and proposes a new approach in detecting food 
price crisis in the country. Using monthly retail rice prices from the 25 major markets in 
Indonesia, the key markets whose price movements can help to forecast price movements in all 
other markets are identified using granger-causality tests that are conducted under the vector 
error correction model framework. The relevance of monitoring the key markets in detecting 
price crisis is tested using Probit and Poisson models. The study found that albeit not all of alert 
phases lead to crises, monitoring the key markets can help to forecast price movements in all 
markets across the country.  
The dissertation continues by reviewing the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) cooperation in stabilizing food prices. The study found that reserve-based price 
stabilization policy has been an integral part of the development agenda of countries in Southeast 
Asia for decades and contributed to price stability which is associated with economic successes 
in the region. However, the operational cost for such policy is high and may result in economic 
inefficiency. Simulation shows that regional cooperation through risk sharing can significantly 
reduce the required stocks which will definitely reduce the costs of holding them. When 
transportation cost is considered due to decentralized storage in different countries, the study 
found that participating countries are still benefited from the cooperation.  
Further, the dissertation investigates the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) in enhancing food trade at the global and regional market. 
The study employs the gravity model of international trade that is developed in a large panel data 
setting, which consists nearly all countries in the world.  Empirical results suggest that the WTO 
and RTAs indeed have enhanced trade among the members, but not yet on the food sector. Only 
RTAs are found to have increased food trade among their member countries, whereas no 
evidence can be found that the WTO has also enhanced food trade among the members. 
Nevertheless, the study found that the WTO has promoted trade as well as food trade of the 
developing countries more than of the developed ones. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation diskutiert die möglichen Rollen von Handel und der Kooperation bei 
Nahrungsmittelreserven zwischen Staaten, mit dem Ziel die Nahrungsmittelpreise zu 
stabilisieren. Dabei liegt ein spezieller Fokus auf Indonesien. Diese Studie analysiert zunächst 
die Bewegungen von Nahrungsmittelpreisen in Indonesien und schlägt einen neuen Ansatz vor, 
um Nahrungsmittelpreiskrisen in dem Land frühzeitig zu erkennen. Für die Analyse werden 
monatliche Daten von Einzelhandelspreisen der 25 größten Märkte in Indonesien verwendet. 
Anhand der Daten von den wichtigsten Märkten können Preisbewegungen in allen anderen 
Märkten vorher gesagt werden. Dafür werden Granger Causality Tests in einem Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) durchgeführt. Die Relevanz der wichtigsten Märkte für die 
Erkennung von Preiskrisen wird durch Probit- und Poisson-Modelle getestet. Diese Studie 
kommt zu dem Resultat, dass, obwohl nicht jede Warnung zu einer Preiskrise geführt hat, die 
Überwachung der wichtigsten Märkte sehr wohl dabei helfen kann die Preisbewegungen in allen 
Märkten des Landes zu beobachten.  
Die Dissertation setzt durch die Überprüfung der Rolle der Vereinigung Südostasiatischer 
Staaten (ASEAN) die Zusammenarbeit bei der Stabilisierung der Lebensmittelpreise. Die Studie 
fand heraus, dass Preisstabilisierungsstrategien basierend auf Nahrungsmittelreserven sind schon 
seit Dekaden wichtige Säulen in der Entwicklungsagenda Südostasiatischer Staaten und tragen 
zur Preisstabilität und damit auch zu der ökonomischen Entwicklung in der Region bei. Jedoch 
sind die operativen Kosten dieser Strategie sehr hoch und es können ökonomische Ineffizienzen 
entstehen. Simulationen zeigen, dass das Teilen von Risiken durch regionale Kooperationen 
signifikant die im Notfall benötigten Lagermengen reduzieren kann und damit auch die 
Lagerhaltungskosten senkt. Selbst wenn die Transportkosten durch dezentrale Lagerhaltung in 
den jeweiligen Ländern hinzu gezogen werden, profitieren teilnehmende Staaten.  
Zudem untersucht diese Dissertation die Rolle die World Trade Organization (WTO) und 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) bei der Verbesserung von Nahrungsmittelhandel auf dem 
globalen und regionalen Markt. Diese Studie bedient sich dabei an einem Gravitätsmodell für 
internationalen Handel und analysiert. Das Modell wurde anhand eines umfangreichen Panel 
Datensatzes erstellt, der nahezu sämtliche Staaten der Welt umfasst. Die empirischen Ergebnisse 
legen nahe, dass die WTO und RTAs durchaus einen handelsverstärkenden Effekt zwischen den 
jeweiligen Mitgliedern haben, was jedoch noch nicht für den Nahrungsmittelsektor gilt. Nur die 
RTAs erhöhen den Nahrungsmittelhandel zwischen ihren Mitgliedern. Für die WTO konnten 
diese Ergebnisse nicht bestätigt werden. Nichtsdestotrotz, diese Studie zeigt dass die WTO 
sowohl den Handel als auch den Nahrungsmittelhandel in Entwicklungsländer stärker fördert als 
in entwickelten Ländern. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background  
After enjoying relatively stable food prices for many years since the last global crisis in the mid-
1970s, the world has been experiencing rapid food price increases, coupled with several spikes in 
recent years. Starting to rise in the mid-2007, reaching a twin peak in mid-2008 and in early-
2011, global food prices have been relatively more volatile since then (von Braun and Tadesse, 
2012). Uncertainty as a result of the excessive price volatility poses major challenges to policy 
makers, especially those in the developing countries who are facing increasing potential food and 
nutrition insecurity as well as political and economic risks in their countries. The food price 
crises encumbered economic growth in many poor countries (Jacks et al., 2011), weakened 
peoples’ food and nutrition security (Tiwari and Zaman, 2010), and drove an additional 105-150 
million people into poverty (de Hoyos and Medvedev, 2011). Furthermore, an unanticipated 
price crisis can induce political instability by the incidence of political riots and civil conflicts 
(Arezki and Brückner, 2014). 
The responses of many countries, however, are often met with uncoordinated national policy 
adjustments with international implications that may destabilize prices further (Martin and 
Anderson, 2012; von Braun et al., 2014). Among the fundamental factors that have been 
observed as drivers of the excessive food price volatility such as climate change, bio-fuel 
policies, and speculation in commodity markets (see for example von Braun and Tadesse, 2012; 
Gilbert 2010; Abbot et al., 2011), export restrictions and aggressive imports introduced by 
countries’ concern about food security are believed also to be among the main key drivers of the 
excessive food price volatility, especially in the 2007/2008 food price crises (World Bank, 2010). 
Trade policy is often used as a means to reduce high and volatile international commodity prices. 
However, a number of studies have shown that the results are often the contrary. Brahmbhatt and 
Christiaensen (2008) who investigated the rising food prices in East Asia found that upward 
pressure on grain prices from bio-fuel policies, rising energy costs, and the falling US dollar 
have been exacerbated by export restrictions introduced by rice-exporting countries concerned 
15 
 
about food security. Anderson and Nelgen (2012) show that export restrictions by food-exporting 
countries are a means to reduce high food prices were often accompanied by ‘panic buying’ 
within numerous food-importing countries, resulting in even higher international prices.  
The crisis has shown that shocks in one part of the world spread easily to the other parts and 
disrupt the entire global food system. Policy responses imposed by one country also have 
impacts on many other countries. In this sense, food price volatility is an international issue 
requiring international actions. Strengthening national policies alone is not sufficient to achieve 
more stable food prices. Enhancement of regional and international collaboration to prevent food 
prices from extreme volatility is critical. However, it remains unknown to what extent the 
coordination and cooperation among countries can be achieved as well as their effectiveness to 
address the problem. This dissertation aims to address this issue by assessing the role of 
cooperation among countries in pursuing more stable food prices with the case study of 
Indonesia and its cooperation in the regional and global economic architecture.  
 
1.2. Indonesia in the Regional and Global Economic Architecture 
Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and a member of the G-20. Trade plays a 
significant role in the economy, contributing roughly 15 percent to GDP1. The country can be 
considered an open economy, with the average most favored tariff of 7 percent2. Exports have 
grown from USD 120 billion in 2009 to USD 203.6 billion in 20113. However, Indonesia’s weak 
export performance resulted in a trade deficit in 2012, its first annual deficit since the late 
1960s4. 
Indonesia is examining its future economic diplomacy options to accomplish more gains from 
trade. In addition to multilateral negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Indonesia is engaging in the bilateral and regional trade cooperation. Bilaterally, Indonesia has 
an agreement with Japan in the framework of the Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership 
(IJEPA). At the regional level, Indonesia is part of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 
                                                            
1 2011 figure based on 2000 constant price. BPS, 2012 
2 2011 figure, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfiles/ID_E.htm accessed on May 1, 2013 
3 www.kemendag.go.id accessed on March 1, 2013 
4 The Economist,  February 23 – March 1, 2013  
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ASEAN-China FTA, ASEAN-India FTA, ASEAN-Korea FTA, and ASEAN-Australia-New 
Zealand FTA.5  
Indonesia is also in various stages of bilateral negotiations with many other countries, such as 
India, Korea, Australia, and the European Union. Furthermore, in the margins of the East Asia 
Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in November 2012, together with other ASEAN countries 
and their six partners, Indonesia launched Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership 
(RCEP)6 negotiations. With a combined market of more than 3 billion people and a GDP of 
about USD 20 trillion7, RCEP would be the largest regional trade cooperation in the world. 
RCEP is an ASEAN-led process and would be open to accession by other countries after the 
completion of negotiations with its 6 partners8. 
Another trade talk that may offers potential for Indonesia is the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
which links Pacific countries in the Americas and the Asia Pacific through international trade. 
The original signatories were Brunei, Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand. The United States, 
Australia, Peru, and Vietnam joined the negotiations in 2008, Malaysia in 2010, Mexico and 
Canada in 2012, and Japan in 2013. Several other countries have also announced their interest in 
joining the TPP negotiations, namely Colombia, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, and South 
Korea. However, although participating countries set the goal to conclude the agreement in 2012, 
the negotiation continues today9. Nevertheless, with some of the RCEP participating countries 
involved in TPP negotiations, both processes provide possible pathways to a free trade area of 
the Asia Pacific and might inspire global trade talks10. However, observers often put TPP and 
RCEP in competing camps, with the former favored by the United States and the latter by China 
(Hiebert, 2012). 
 
                                                            
5 www.kemendag.go.id accessed on March 1, 2013 
6 RCEP participating countries are ASEAN countries (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam) plus their six partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and 
South Korea) 
7 Based on 2011 figures 
8 www.asean.org, accessed on March 1, 2013 
9 August 2015 
10 After several years of deadlock to conclude the Doha Development Agenda, the 9th WTO ministerial meeting in 
Bali, Indonesia December 2013 was successful in delivering the first trade agreement in the history of the WTO, as 
agreed by all member countries.  
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1.3. Objectives of the Study 
The dissertation aims to analyze the roles of trade and food reserve cooperation in mitigating the 
excessive food price volatility and pursuing more stable food prices. The conceptual framework 
of the study is shown as follows: 
Figure 1.1. Conceptual Framework 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
As shown above, domestic food prices are fundamentally determined by domestic food demand 
and supply. Food supply comes from production and trade, including food reservation through 
government and private stockholding. The national market is part of bigger markets: regional and 
global. Therefore, domestic price is also connected to the world price through international trade. 
This world food price is influenced by many factors. In addition to global food demand and 
supply, studies found that other factors such as climate change, bio-fuel policy, trade policy, and 
speculation may also drive prices (von Braun and Tadesse, 2012; Gilbert 2010; Abbot et al., 
2011). 
The focus of the study is analyzing the relation between international trade and food prices. It 
investigates whether global and regional trade cooperation can help to facilitate more stable food 
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prices. In order to achieve this objective, the investigation is conducted at three levels of 
analytical inquiry: national, regional, and international levels. The study aims to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. What are the characteristics of food price movements in terms of volatilities, spikes, and 
trends in the different markets in Indonesia? Can the price crisis in the different markets 
in Indonesia be detected through an efficient approach? 
2. To what extent can regional trade and reserve cooperation help in pursuing more stable 
regional food prices? 
3. To what extent do multilateral and regional trade agreements contribute to enhance food 
trade in the global and regional markets? 
 
1.4. Structure of the Dissertation  
The dissertation begins with an analysis at the national level. Following this introduction chapter, 
Chapter 2 presents the analysis of food price dynamics in Indonesia and proposes a new 
approach in monitoring food price movement in many different markets in the country, including 
forecasting potential price crises that may occur. The study applies the concept of price 
transmission and market integration across Indonesian provinces. Price crisis is defined from the 
consumer point of view, which is the price above a certain level of price that can be considered 
as normal. Using the monthly retail rice prices from the 25 major markets in Indonesia, the key 
markets whose price movements can help to forecast price movements in all other markets are 
identified using Granger causality tests that are conducted under the vector error correction 
model framework. The relevance of monitoring the key markets in detecting price crisis is tested 
using Probit and Poisson models.  
Chapter 3 follows by reviewing the storage-based price stabilization policy in Southeast Asia and 
discussing its prospect in the current new era of price instability.  The chapter provides 
information on ASEAN market structure and describes food reserve policy at the national and 
regional levels in ASEAN. Simulations are provided to show how countries can benefit from 
regional cooperation. The chapter also provides a brief discussion on public stockholding in the 
WTO framework. 
19 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the contribution of the enormous number of trade agreements in bringing 
the world into a freer flow of food. The study employs the gravity model of international trade to 
analyze whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 
have enhanced member countries’ food trade. The model is developed in a large panel data 
setting consisting of 162 countries within the time period from 1990-2012.  The analysis also 
differentiates countries by their level of development and by region. In addition, the analysis of 
selected regional trade agreements around the globe is also provided. The last chapter in the 
dissertation provides a general conclusion.  
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Chapter 2. Food Price Movements in Indonesia: Detecting Crisis 
from the Key Markets 
 
2.1. Background 
The recent waves of the global food price crisis affect almost all countries in the world. 
Indonesia is no exception. It is among many countries that have experienced a steep increase in 
food prices in the recent years (Figure 2.1). Moreover, Indonesia has experienced high food price 
volatility accompanied by high risk of food and nutrition insecurity. Using the food price index 
data from ILOSTAT combined with anthropometric data from WHO, UNICEF, and the World 
Bank, Mujahid and Kalkuhl (2014) show that Indonesia is among countries that experience 
“high” or “very high” food price volatility as well as “high” or “very high” chronic and acute 
malnutrition.  
Figure 2.1.  Food price index of selected countries 2001 – 2014 (2000=100, real price) 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E accessed on August 18, 2015.  
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Notwithstanding the high economic growth in the past decade, Indonesia is still home to 30 
million people living under the poverty line and an additional 65 million people vulnerable to 
poverty (World Bank, 2012). These poor households, who are like many others in developing 
countries, spend more than half of their income on food (von Braun and Tadesse, 2012). Thus, 
soaring food prices in recent years have reduced the purchasing power of a large part of the 
Indonesian population, thus threatening their food and nutrition security. In addition, although 
high food prices may have different impacts on poverty in different countries, studies have found 
that the increase of food prices raises the rate of poverty in Indonesia (Ivanic et al., 2012; Warr 
and Yusuf, 2013).  
Furthermore, Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the world consisting of more than 
13,000 islands; around 6,000 of them are inhabited11. Food markets in the country are spread in 
its archipelago at considerable distances. In this context, international food price dynamics might 
not be directly observable in all markets in the country. Thus, it is highly important to test the 
market integration of Indonesia to analyze how connected food prices among domestic markets 
are as well as their linkages with international food markets. In addition, given the peculiar 
geographic characteristic of the country, a sound and efficient approach to monitoring food price 
movements in many different markets in Indonesia is needed to better anticipate any potential 
occurrence of abnormal food prices in the country.  
Using the concepts of price transmission and market integration, the study aims to investigate 
whether price movements in the many different markets in Indonesia can be monitored by 
focusing only on the key markets. Furthermore, the relevance of monitoring the key markets in 
detecting potential price crisis events in Indonesia is also investigated. The approach is based on 
the information provided by market price. A market is said to be efficient when its prices reflect 
all available information not only on the current food availability but also on agents’ 
expectations about future scarcity (Deaton and Laroque, 1992; Ravallion, 1985). Similar to this 
approach, Araujo et al. (2012) use price signals to detect potential price crises in Mali, Burkina 
Faso, and Niger.   
                                                            
11 Badan Informasi Geospasial/Geospatial Information Body http://www.bakosurtanal.go.id/ accessed December 
5th, 2014. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides the context of the 
analysis and description of price data that will be used. Section 2.3 explores the prices in the 25 
markets in Indonesia to further define price crises.  Section 2.4 aims to identify the key markets 
whose prices can be used to forecast the price movements in all other markets. In Section 2.5, the 
relevance of using the key markets to detect price crises is investigated. Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2. Context and Data Description 
Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and the fourth most populous country in the 
world12 (UN DESA, 2013). Food supply in Indonesia mostly comes from its own production. 
Rice, sugar, and palm oil are the three most important agricultural commodities being produced 
in the country. Nevertheless, supplies of some food commodities are not met by own production, 
including rice, Indonesians’ main staple food, which accounts for nearly half of its citizens’ 
caloric intake13. Indonesia is still importing around 3 to 6 percent of its domestic rice supply to 
meet the country’s demand (FAOSTAT, 2014). 
Figure 2.2. Indonesian's per capita calorie intake 2011 
 
Source: own elaboration based on FAOSTAT 
                                                            
12 After China, India, and USA 
13 Own estimation based on FAOSTAT. 
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For many years, food price stabilization in Indonesia was managed by Badan Urusan Logistik 
(BULOG), a national food reserve agency created in 1968 with a special objective to protect 
domestic markets from sharp fluctuations of prices in the world markets. The end of the New 
Order regime in the late 1990s was the emerging era of a more open trade policy in Indonesia. 
The country loosened its monopoly structure and created competition within the domestic 
market. BULOG lost its domestic power to monopolize sugar and rice trade, because Indonesia 
was required to comply with the IMF Letter of Intent to make the market more efficient. After 
finishing the engagement with IMF, Indonesia decided to shift to a more managed trade policy 
and started to impose tariffs on sugar and rice imports.  
Figure 2.3.  Prices of food commodities in Indonesia before and after major reform 
  
SSD before 1998=0.058 after 1998 = 0.105 SSD before 1998=0.036 after 1998 = 0.127 
  
SSD before 1998=0.039 after 1998 = 0.106 SSD before 1998=0.030 after 1998 = 0.156 
 
Note: SSD=Standard deviations of log of prices in difference (volatility) 
Source: Own estimations based on BPS/Statistics Indonesia data 
 
 
The policy was not in place long, as Indonesia started to create a more liberal economy by 
reducing tariffs. Since then, export-oriented policies have permeated Indonesia’s agricultural 
trade policy. Agricultural exports increased by 16 percent on average annually during 2004-2009 
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(Octaviani et al., 2010). However, during this ‘Reform Era’ in which the market was relatively 
open, food prices were also relatively higher and more volatile than they were before, when 
BULOG had strong power to intervene in the market (Figure 2.3). Calculating the volatility 
using standard deviations of log of prices in difference (SSD) for some commodities including 
rice, sugar, wheat flour, and cooking oil shows that the SSD are much higher for the periods after 
1998 compared to the periods before 1998. Nevertheless, BULOG ran at high fiscal costs. A 
financial audit report by Arthur Anderson covering the period from April 1993 to March 1998 
suggests that the total deficit of BULOG was about 400 million USD per year (Arifin, 2008). 
The focus of this study is rice, the main staple food for Indonesians. The analysis uses monthly 
retail rice prices from 25 major markets in Indonesia for the periods of 2000-2013. The sample 
markets in this study are among the 33 main markets of the capital city provinces in Indonesia, 
which spread in its five main islands and 30 other smaller islands (Figure 2.4). The data come 
from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), the national bureau of statistics of Indonesia. BPS regularly 
publishes the weighted average of several different types of rice that are sold in all major retail 
markets in Indonesia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Sample markets  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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2.3. Analysis of Food Price Movement: How to Define Crisis 
Despite the presence of a relatively well-established concept of food security14, no common 
definition of food price crisis can be found in the literature (Cuesta et al., 2014). In fact, without 
any clear concept, the term food price crisis is widely known and used for analytical and 
operational purposes, especially in explaining the global excessive price volatility and spike 
events in 2008 and 2011. At this point, it is important to understand the different terms that are 
commonly used to explain price dynamics. Von Braun and Tadesse (2012) observed that most 
studies on food price dynamics focus on high food prices. They argue, however, that price 
movements should be distinguished in terms of trend, volatility, and spike.  
A price trend is a smooth, long-term average movement of prices over time that shows the 
general tendency of prices for a certain period of time. Price volatility refers to frequent short-
term fluctuations of the prices around a rather stable long-term price or price trend. It measures 
the strength and frequency of the price changes. In general, both positive and negative variations 
affect price volatility. Sets of methods are available in the literature to analyze price volatility. 
Common methods include (i) the coefficient of variation from mean or trend (Huchet-Bourdon, 
2011), (ii) changes of log returns (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010), and (iii) GARCH models (Roache, 
2010; Karali and Power, 2013). Price spike is another concept that is used to explain price 
dynamics. While volatility measures the price fluctuation (in either direction) over a certain 
period, price spikes are usually measured as relative changes of prices over two consecutive 
periods. The most common way to measure price spike is to use the logarithm of the rate of 
period-over-period prices.  
Figure 5 shows food price volatility in global and Indonesia’s food markets, estimated using the 
coefficient of variation from trend. The upper map shows the rate of food price volatility in 
different countries in the world using data from ILO for the period of 2000-2012. The countries 
are divided into quintiles to describe the rate of volatility, which range among the categories of 
very low, low, medium, high, and very high.  In this map, Indonesia can be seen as among the 
high rates of volatility compared to all other countries.  
                                                            
14 FAO concept of food security: “food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic 
access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food for a healthy and active life” is considered to be widely accepted. 
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Figure 2.5. Food price volatility in the global and Indonesia markets  
 
 
Note: The global market (upper map) uses the monthly food price index for the periods 2000 – 2012 taken from ILO 
database. The Indonesia market (lower map) uses monthly retail rice price data for the periods 2000 – 2013 taken 
from Statistics of Indonesia. 
Source: Mujahid and Kalkuhl (2014) and own elaboration. 
 
The lower map shows the food price volatility in the different markets in Indonesia using the 
price data taken from Statistics of Indonesia for the periods of 2000-2013. As in the upper map 
for the global market, the major markets in Indonesia are divided into quintiles. The map shows 
that Padang, Pekanbaru, Banjarmasin, and Palangkaraya experience the highest volatility among 
all major markets in Indonesia. Padang and Pekanbaru are two neighboring markets on Sumatera 
Island, while Banjarmasin and Palangkaraya are two neighboring markets on Kalimantan Island. 
Interestingly, that the two pairs of the highest volatility markets are neighboring with the markets 
that experience low volatility. A closer look into the data reveals that the rates of volatility in the 
different markets in Indonesia are not much different from each other. Therefore, the difference 
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between the lowest rate of volatility and the highest rate of volatility is very small, although they 
are shown in the map in different colors since the markets are divided into quintiles. 
Price variations can have severe impacts when they are abrupt and unanticipated by the 
economic agents (HLPE, 2011). It is also important to note that price changes may have different 
impacts on the different economic agents. High food prices can be incentives for net food 
producers to produce more food. More income can be generated when food prices are on the 
upward trend relative to input prices. On the other hand, high food prices negatively impact 
consumers. Poor people will have to spend much more of their income on food when the prices 
are higher.  
In the absence of a common definition of food price crisis, for the purpose of the analysis, this 
study will use a definition of crisis that focuses on the customers’ point of view. According to 
this definition, food markets are considered to be in a crisis when the observed price is above a 
certain level of the price that can be considered normal. The analysis first estimates the price 
trend for each market over the whole period using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter). The HP 
filter is widely used to remove cyclical components of macroeconomic time series data to obtain 
a smoothed-curved representation of the series, which can be written as: 
minఛ ሺ෍ሺݕ௧ െ	߬௧ሻଶ
்
௧ୀଵ
൅ 		෍ሾሺ߬௧ାଵ െ	߬௧ሻ െ	ሺ߬௧ െ	߬௧ିଵሻሿଶ
்ିଵ
௧ୀଶ
ሻ	 
The first term of the equation is the sum of the squared deviations ݀௧ ൌ 	ݕ௧ െ	߬௧ which penalizes 
the cyclical component. The second term is a multiple smoothing parameter (ሻ of the sum of 
squares of the trend component’s second differences. This second term penalizes variation in the 
growth rate of the trend component. The larger the , the larger the penalty for the second term.  
As recommended for monthly data,  is chosen to be 129600.  
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Figure 2.6. Rice price and trend in Jakarta 
 
Source: own elaboration based on BPS data. 
 
The definition of an abnormal price (i.e. a price above a certain level that can be considered as 
normal) is based on the relative spread and not on the absolute price level because inflation and 
long-term trends increase the absolute spread in both directions (positive and negative).   For 
instance, an increase of Rp.100/kg is large if the price is Rp.200/kg but small if the price is 
Rp.1000/kg. To obtain a relative spread, we divide the price series by its HP-price trend, which 
normalizes the mean price to 1. The standard deviation is further estimated from these relative 
fluctuations for the analyzed period. A market is considered to be in crisis when the relative 
spread between the relative price and its mean value is greater than two standard deviations 
(Figure 2.7). For poor consumers, who usually spend more than half of their income on food, the 
price level of greater than two standard deviations is a severe shock to their purchasing power, 
since they experience such fluctuations only rarely. Assuming normally distributed prices, 95 
percent of the relative price spreads should be smaller than 1.96 standard deviations and larger 
than -1.96 standard deviations. Thus, one would expect prices above 2 standard deviations in less 
than 2.5 percent of the observations.  
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To illustrate, in Jakarta, the price level greater than two standard deviations is 16 percent higher 
than the trend price (Figure 2.7). If the share of food expenditure in total expenditure of the poor 
people in Indonesia is 63.3 percent (von Braun and Tadesse, 2012), then a crisis reduces their 
purchasing power by roughly 10 percent (16 percent times 63.3 percent). This implies that the 
share of their food expenditure in total expenditure would increase to 73.3 percent. In other 
areas, the number can be even higher. In Banjarmasin, for instance, the price level greater than 
two standard deviations is 28 percent higher than the normal price. This implies that the share of 
food expenditures in the total expenditure of the poor would increase to 81 percent. This 
abnormal price that increases purchasing power deficiency in such ways would also increase 
food deficiency. 
 
Figure 2.7. Food price crisis in Jakarta 
 
 Source: own elaboration 
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2.4. Key Markets Identification 
The idea of monitoring food price movements only in key markets relies on the concept of 
spatial price transmission and market integration. The underlying theory of spatial price 
transmission is spatial arbitrage, which implies that the difference between prices of 
homogeneous goods in different markets is only subject to transaction costs. Therefore, most 
empirical works in spatial price transmission analysis aim at assessing whether the Law of One 
Price holds or not (Listorti and Esposti, 2012).  
Our analysis aims to measure the degree of integration between each pair of markets and uses 
this information to analyze how markets are connected with each other. Two markets are defined 
as being integrated when shocks arising in one market are transmitted to the other market 
(Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). More specifically, market i for good x is said to be spatially 
integrated with market j for the same good if a shock in i that changes, for instance, demand in i 
but not in j, affects the prices in both i and j.  This implies that the price series for a homogenous 
commodity in the two markets share a long-run stochastic trend.  
The study identifies the key markets whose prices can help to forecast price movements in other 
markets by Granger-causality tests. These are conducted in the vector error correction (VEC) 
model framework. The Granger-causality is a statistical hypothesis test on whether one time 
series is useful in forecasting another (Granger, 1969). This study tests whether there is a 
Granger-causal relationship between prices on market i and prices on market j.  
The VEC model is appropriate to analyze the short-term and long-term effects of one market on 
another when two conditions are met. First, every price series is non stationary and integrated in 
degree 1, which can be written as I(1), and second, two or more series are co-integrated. When 
two I(1) are co-integrated, there exists a linear combination of the two series that is stationary. 
The study analyzes two prices at a time, so that the co-integrating equation can be written as: 
௜ܲ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ 	ߚ ௝ܲ ൅ ߝ	  or  ߝ ൌ 	 ௜ܲ െ ߙ െ 	ߚ ௝ܲ,    where ߝ is stationary. 
The stationarity of each price series is tested using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), and the 
results show that the price series for all markets are non-stationary, and each pair of the series is 
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also found to be co-integrated15, which means that there is a long-run relationship between prices 
of two markets. The VEC model for each pair of the price series is estimated using the following 
formulation: 
∆ ௧ܲ௜ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ 	ߠ൫ ௧ܲିଵ௜ െ 	ߚ ௧ܲିଵ௝ ൯ ൅ 	ߜ∆ ௧ܲିଵ௝ ൅ 	ߩ∆ ௧ܲିଵ௝ ൅	ߟ௧	 
Where ௧ܲ௜ is the price of market i and ௧ܲ
௝ is the price of market j. ∆ is the difference operator, so 
∆ ௧ܲ ൌ 	 ௧ܲ െ 	 ௧ܲିଵ. ߙ, ߠ, ߚ, ߜ, ߩ	are the estimated parameters and ߟ௧ is error term. 
Having already concluded that each pair of the price series is co-integrated, meaning that the two 
series have a long-run causal relationship, the causality being tested in the VEC model indicates 
a short-run Granger-causality. It is important to note that, if i is said to Granger cause j, this does 
not imply that j is the result of i. Granger-causality measures precedence and information 
content, but does not by itself indicate causality in the more common term. Here, the Granger-
causality test shows whether prices in one market lead another. The results of the tests are shown 
in Table 2.1. 
The study attempts to find one market in which Granger-causes most other relevant markets. In 
other words, prices in this market play significant roles in explaining prices in other markets and 
can help to predict the latter. However, the results show that no single market Granger-causes all 
other markets. Surabaya and Palangkaraya are the two markets that Granger-cause most other 
markets but not all markets (each of them only Granger causes 21 markets). This means that 
three markets are not Granger-caused by each of them. When the population is considered, Riau 
is found to have the largest effect, although it Granger-causes only 19 other markets. For the 
effect on poor population, Palangkaraya is found to have the largest effect compared to all other 
markets.  
 
 
 
                                                            
15 Co‐integration test is performed by Engle Granger two steps method by testing the stationarity of residuals ε 
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Table 2.1. Granger-causality test results 
Market  Granger-causes… 
other markets 
Population affected 
(millions) 
Poor population 
affected (millions) 
Banda Aceh 13 146.6 16.2 
Medan 18 198.5 23.0 
Padang 16 213.1 24.3 
Riau 19 220.8 24.7 
Jambi 14 183.7 21.3 
Palembang 19 199.3 22.6 
Bengkulu 19 214.0 24.4 
Bandar Lampung 17 209.1 23.8 
Jakarta 17 207.4 22.8 
Bandung 17 197.4 22.2 
Semarang 20 207.3 24.0 
Yogyakarta 18 216.1 24.4 
Surabaya 21 209.4 24.5 
Denpasar 19 202.6 23.3 
Mataram 16 199.6 22.7 
Kupang 18 205.8 23.3 
Pontianak 18 199.4 22.0 
Palangkaraya 21 218.8 24.8 
Banjarmasin 18 206.3 24.2 
Samarinda 18 207.1 22.9 
Manado 17 199.3 22.6 
Palu 15 190.6 22.0 
Makassar 20 219.8 24.6 
Kendari 12 135.9 16.7 
Jayapura 13 182.2 20.9 
Note: Granger causality tests are conducted in the VEC model framework and performed separately for each pair of 
the markets at the significance level of 5percent. 
 
The focus of the study is to predict price movements using the information from the market. 
Therefore, the study aims to find the market that Granger-causes all other markets in the country. 
However, since a single market that Granger-causes all other market cannot be found, the study 
considers more than one market to be identified as the key market. The combination of Surabaya 
and Palangkaraya is found to Granger-cause all markets in Indonesia. Thus, the two markets are 
identified as the key markets, as their prices are expected to help in forecasting prices in all other 
markets in Indonesia. 
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Table 2.2. Granger-causality test for the key markets 
Key Market Not granger causes.. 
Surabaya Jakarta, Banjarmasin, Makassar 
Palangkaraya Pekanbaru, Samarinda, Palu 
Note: Granger causality tests are conducted in the VEC model framework at the significance level of 5percent. 
 
An additional Granger-causality test is performed to analyze how integrated the Indonesian 
markets are with the international market. Using the rice price in Bangkok as international price, 
the result of the test shows that 20 markets in Indonesia are Granger-caused by the international 
price. This means that price movements in many markets in the country follow price movements 
in the international markets. Thus, although the international price movements cannot fully 
explain the price dynamics in all of the markets in Indonesia, monitoring the international price 
can also be used as an alternative to explain price movements in many different markets in 
Indonesia. However, the following analysis will focus on testing the relevance of monitoring the 
key markets in detecting price crisis since the combination of Surabaya and Palangkaraya (as the 
key markets) can explain price movements in all markets in Indonesia. 
 
Table 2.3. Granger-causality test from international market 
International Market Granger-causes … Indonesian markets Not granger-causes.. 
Bangkok 20 Riau, Palangkaraya, Samarinda, Manado, Palu 
Note: Granger causality tests are conducted in the VEC model framework at the significance level of 5percent. 
 
 
 
2.5. Detecting Price Crisis by Monitoring the Key Markets 
This section is devoted to test the relevance of using the key markets to predict the price crisis in 
Indonesia. As defined previously, markets are considered in crisis when the relative spread; i.e. 
the spread between the relative price and its mean value is greater than two standard deviations. 
First, the study determines an alert indicator that is expected to predict the crisis. Furthermore, 
the probability that an alert on the key markets will lead to a crisis on one (or more) of the other 
markets is tested econometrically using Probit and Poisson regression models.  
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2.5.1. Alert Indicator 
The analysis starts by identifying the periods of abnormal prices based on the relative spread of 
the prices. The crisis phase, in which the spread between the relative price and its mean value is 
more than two standard deviations, is usually preceded by a phase of increasing price that moves 
from the level that can be considered as normal. The periods of this increasing price are 
considered an alert phase: an alert is defined as an event during which the spread of the relative 
price is more than one standard deviation but below two standard deviations (Figure 2.8). The 
alert indicator to predict a potential crisis in any market in the country will be the alert phase of 
the two key markets. The following Probit and Poisson models will test whether it is relevant to 
observe the alert indicator in the key markets to predict crises in other markets. 
Figure 2.8. Alert and crisis phases in the key markets  
  
Source: Own elaboration 
 
2.5.2. Probit Model 
The probit model, also called probit regression, is used to model dichotomous or binary outcome 
variables. The inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
is used as a link function to map a linear combination of the predictors to the binary outcome. 
The regression aims at assessing the probability that an alert in the key markets leads to a crisis 
in any market of the country. The dependent variable is a binary variable taking value 1 if one or 
more markets are in the crisis phase at time t, and 0 otherwise. The independent variable is a 
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binary variable of the alert phase of each key market, taking value 1 if the key market is on alert, 
and 0 otherwise. A regression model is created by parameterizing the probability of the 
occurrence of a crisis to depend on a regressor of the alert phase of the key market where: 
݌௜௧∗ ൌ ߚݔ௞௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
 ݌௜௧∗  is the latent dependent variable which refers to the probability of the crisis; ݌௜௧ is the 
observed binary outcome variable defined as: 
݌௜௧ ൌ ൜ 1	݂݅	݌௜௧
∗ ൐ 0
0	݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ 
ݔ௞௧ିଵ is the alert phase at the lagged value of each key market and ߝ௞௧ is error term. Although the 
alert phase at time t-1 is preferable since it is used as a predictive measure, the study also 
attempts to use the alert phase at time t to analyze the price dynamics among the markets at the 
contemporaneous time. The alert phase of Surabaya and Palangkaraya that may lead to crisis in 
any market of the country is tested separately. The results of the tests are as follows: 
Table 2.4. Probit regression result 
Key Market Alert at time t-1 Alert at time t 
Surabaya 0.3956 (0.3120) 
0.8334*** 
(0.2987) 
Palangkaraya 1.0815*** (0.3686) 
1.0597*** 
(0.3682) 
 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
The results show the alert in the key market that may lead to crisis in any other market in the 
next month (alert at time t-1) is statistically insignificant for Surabaya, while for Palangkaraya, 
the coefficient is positive and statistically significant (1.08). For the alert at time t, the alert at the 
key market that may lead to crisis in any other market in the same month is positive and 
statistically significant for both key markets with the coefficient 0.83 and 1.06 for Surabaya and 
Palangkaraya, respectively.  
From these results, the study considers the predicted probability with the following categories: 
(i) Alert in the key market that may lead to crisis in any other market. 
(ii) Alert in the key market that may lead to no crisis in any other market. 
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(iii) No alert in the key market that may lead to crisis in any other market. 
(iv) No alert in the key market that may lead to no crisis in any other market. 
The predicted probabilities of the above categories are as follows: 
Table 2.5. Predicted probability of crises 
Key Market Time t-1 Time t Alert=0 Alert=1 Alert=0 Alert=1 
 Crisis 
= 0 
Crisis 
= 1 
Crisis 
= 0 
Crisis 
= 1 
Crisis 
= 0 
Crisis 
= 1 
Crisis 
= 0 
Crisis 
= 1 
Surabaya - - - - 0.86 0.14 0.59 0.41 
Palangkaraya 0.84 0.16 0.46 0.54 0.83 0.17 0.46 0.54 
Note: Alert=0 (no alert); Alert=1 (Alert); Crisis=0 (no crisis); Crisis=1 (Crisis) 
Table 2.5 shows the predicted probabilities of (no) alert in the key markets that may lead to (no) 
crisis in any other market. While we cannot say much for Surabaya, since the coefficient in the 
probit regression is statistically insignificant, an alert in Palangkaraya may lead to 54 percent 
probability of crisis in any other market in the next month. This also means that, when we 
observe an alert in Palangkaraya, the probability of no crisis in any other markets in the next 
month is 46 percent. On the other hand, when we do not observe alert in Palangkaraya, the 
probability of no crisis in any other markets in the next month is 84 percent, and the probability 
of crisis that may occur in any other markets in the next month is 16 percent. 
At the contemporaneous time, when we observe an alert in Surabaya, there is a probability of 41 
percent crisis and 59 percent probability of no crisis in any other markets. On the other hand, 
when we do not observe an alert in Surabaya, there is still 14 percent probability of crisis and 86 
percent probability of no crisis in any other markets. For Palangkaraya, an alert may lead to a 54 
percent probability of crisis and 46 percent of no crisis in any other markets, and when we do not 
observe alert, the probability of crisis and no crisis in any other market is 17 percent and 83 
percent, respectively.  
Although the results indicate that not all alerts at the two key markets lead to a crisis, monitoring 
price movement in the two key markets can help to better anticipate possible price crisis events. 
By observing alert or no alert in the two key markets, the probability of crisis or no crisis in any 
other markets that may occur can be predicted. While there is still much uncertainty in predicting 
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crises when alerts are issues at the key markets (which is natural, as these are rare extreme events 
that do not occur very often), the lack of alerts gives rather high confidence that no crisis occurs 
at any other market. This asymmetry in the prediction power should be kept in mind. It is also 
important to note that the alert that has predictive power is not only at the lagged time but also at 
the contemporaneous time. This is possible since monthly price data are used in the analysis 
while price dynamics among the markets may be faster than monthly changes. 
 
2.5.3. Poisson Model 
The second analysis is based on a Poisson model that seeks to explain the extent of the crisis. 
The dependent variable is the number of markets within the country that will be in crisis if the 
key market is on alert. The Poisson regression is appropriate when the dependent variable is 
count data. The independent variable remains the same as in Probit regression, which is a binary 
variable of the alert phase of each key market, taking a value of 1 if the key market is on alert 
and 0 otherwise. 
The basic Poisson probability specification can be written as: 
݂ሺݕ௧|ݔ௧ିଵሻ ൌ 	 ݁
ఓߤ௬೟
ݕ௧!  
Where ݕ௧ is factorial, it is the number of markets that is experiencing a price crisis at time t. ݔ௧ିଵ 
is the alert phase at the lagged time of each key market and ߤ is the parameter of Poisson 
distribution. As in the probit regression, we attempt also to analyze price dynamics among the 
markets at the contemporaneous time, which means that the alert at time t is also analyzed. For  
ߤ ൐ 0, the mean and variance of this distribution can be shown to be:  
ܧሺݕሻ ൌ 	ݒܽݎሺݕሻ ൌ 	ߤ 
Since the mean is equal to the variance, any factor that affects one will also affect the other; thus, 
the usual assumption of homoscedasticity would not be appropriate for Poisson data. The results 
of the Poisson tests are as follows: 
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Table 2.6. Poisson regression result 
Key Market t-1 t 
Surabaya 1.3186*** (0.2031) 
0.6806*** 
(0.2278) 
Palangkaraya 1.6809*** (0.2067) 
1.6771*** 
(0.3480) 
 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
The results show that all coefficients are positive and statistically significant, which imply that 
an alert in Surabaya leads to an increase of the number of other markets that will be in crisis in 
the next month by 1.32, and an alert in Palangkaraya leads to an increase of a number of other 
markets that will be in crisis in the next month by 1.68. At the contemporaneous time, an alert in 
Surabaya leads to an increase in the number of other markets that will be in crisis by 0.68, and an 
alert in Palangkaraya leads to an increase of the number of other markets that will be in crisis by 
1.68.  
 
2.6. Summary and Conclusion 
Indonesia is among the countries that experience high food price volatility accompanied by high 
risk of food and nutrition security (Mujahid and Kalkuhl, 2014). Detecting excessive price spikes 
is prime for a developing country such as Indonesia, a large part of whose citizens spend more 
than half of their income on food. Thus, uncertainty as a result of food price volatility threatens 
their food and nutrition security. This study investigates price movements in the major markets 
in Indonesia, identifies the key markets, and analyzes whether price movements in all markets in 
the country can be monitored by focusing only on the key markets.  
The study uses monthly retail rice prices from 25 major markets in Indonesia for the periods of 
2000-2013. The key markets are identified using Granger-causality tests that are conducted 
within the VEC model framework. The results show that Surabaya and Palangkaraya can be 
considered as the key markets, whose price movements can help to explain prices in all other 
markets. This finding is not surprising, as Surabaya and Palangkaraya are two important cities in 
the trade network within Indonesia. Surabaya has an important port connecting Java Island with 
many other islands, and Palangkaraya is located in central Kalimantan, which may influence 
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many other markets, especially those in the east part of Indonesia. Thus, despite that rice 
production volume of the two markets relative to their population is not much bigger than the 
other markets, their role as market hub connecting many other markets make it possible for them 
to play such an indicator role as the key markets.  
Granger-causality test on rice price in Bangkok as international price shows that 20 markets in 
Indonesia are Granger-caused by the international price. This means that price movements in 
many markets in the country follow price movements in the international markets. Thus, 
although the international price movements cannot fully explain the price dynamics in all of the 
markets in Indonesia, monitoring the international price can also be used as an alternative to 
explain price movements in many different markets in Indonesia. However, this study focuses on 
testing the relevance of monitoring the key markets in detecting price crisis, since the 
combination of Surabaya and Palangkaraya (as the key markets) can explain price movements in 
all markets in Indonesia. The results of the tests using Probit and Poisson models indicate that, 
although not all alerts at the two key markets lead to crises, monitoring price movement in the 
two key markets can help to better anticipate possible price crisis events. By observing alert or 
no alert in the two key markets, the probability of crisis or no crisis in any other markets that 
may occur can be predicted.  
This study shows an efficient approach in monitoring price movement using the information 
from market prices. In a large developing country such as Indonesia, where markets are located 
in different islands with considerable distances, the results become important, as it is possible to 
monitor price movement in a country with fewer resources. By monitoring only Surabaya and 
Palangkaraya, price movements in the 25 markets in Indonesia (affecting more than 27 million 
poor) can be forecasted. While one may argue that the cost of monitoring food prices in all 
markets is low in the current new era of information technology, the proposed study can serve as 
an alternative approach, which can be useful in integrating policies between different markets.  
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Chapter 3. ASEAN Food Reserve and Trade: Review and Prospect  
 
3.1. Introduction  
High uncertainty and volatility of food prices in the recent years have renewed the interests of 
many countries in considering food reserves as an important instrument in managing food price 
instability. These reserves come back into the focus of policy agenda as a result of the huge 
doubts on the reliability of international trade to guarantee food supply. The 2008 crisis, in 
particular, highlighted that low levels of food stocks make countries vulnerable to excessive 
price volatility even only with low levels of supply or demand shocks (Wright, 2009).  
Countries in Southeast Asia have been using storage-based price stabilization for decades 
(Rashid et. al., 2006). Grain price stabilization in the Philippines started in 1960s, carried out by 
Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) and Rice and Corn Board (RICOB). In Indonesia, price 
stabilization is managed by Badan Urusan Logistik (BULOG), a national food reserve agency 
created in 1967. At the regional level, the cooperation on food reserves has been ongoing since 
the late 1970s, when the original members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) established the Agreement on Food Security Reserve (AFSR). The ASEAN 
Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR) was created in 1979 with the initial earmarks of 50,000 tons of 
rice to serve as the subset of national stocks in addressing food emergencies in the region. 
However, due to small size of the stocks and its complex release mechanism, the AERR had 
never really been activated during the entire operational period of more than a quarter of a 
century (Dano, 2006).  
The recent food price crisis affecting almost all countries in the world led to a new phase of the 
regional reserve cooperation in Southeast Asia. The ten member countries of ASEAN, in 
partnership with China, Japan and Korea, agreed on the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice 
Reserve (APTERR), which entered into force in July 2012. The APTERR is a permanent reserve 
scheme which replaces the pilot project East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR), which 
itself was presented as a metamorphosis of the AERR. The initial earmark of APTERR is 
787,000 tons of rice, roughly twice the size of von Braun and Torero’s (2009) proposal for a 
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modest emergency grain reserve of 300,000-500,000 metric tons for the whole world. However, 
the APTERR has hardly been tested in practice. Since entering into force, only 200 tons of rice 
have been released at the end of 2012 for poverty alleviation and the malnutrition eradication 
program in Indonesia, and another 800 tons of rice in early 2014 for typhoon Haiyan victims in 
the Philippines. Several other small releases have been made during its pilot phase from 2004-
2010.16 
This study aims to review the storage-based price-stabilization policy in Southeast Asia, both at 
the national and regional level, and to discuss the prospect of the policy in the current era of 
price instability. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a 
brief literature review on food reserve and trade cooperation. Section 3.3 follows by providing 
information on ASEAN market structure, which will discuss the food trade and development of 
trade cooperation in the region. Section 3.4 and 3.5 describe food reserves at the national and 
regional level in ASEAN, including a discussion on their cost and benefit. The discussion about 
food reserves at the national level will use several countries in ASEAN as examples, while at the 
regional level, the discussion will mainly focus on the ASEAN+3.17 Section 3.6 analyzes the 
WTO rules on public stockholding, and the last section provides the concluding remarks. 
 
3.2. Food Reserve and Trade Cooperation 
Empirical literature emphasizes the interchangeability of food reserve and trade to balance 
unstable production (Williams and Wright, 1991; Makki et al, 1996). Trade is advantageous if 
supply shocks between countries are negatively or uncorrelated (Koester, 1984). On the contrary, 
securing stocks through storage is favorable for countries that switch between net-importer and 
net-exporter. Moreover, food reserve is more favorable to trade for countries that bear high 
transportation cost such as landlocked countries.  
In response to the global food crisis 2007/2008, many governments carry out intervention 
policies through the implementation or enhancement of public reserve. However, these 
                                                            
16 www.apterr.org accessed on 17 September 2014. 
17 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam; Plus Three Countries (+3) are China, Japan, Rep. Korea.  
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interventions are often criticized due to their effects in distorting markets and high cost of 
operation (Tchirley and Jayne, 2010; Newberry and Stiglitz, 1981). On the other hand, 
international trade appears to be powerless in dampening price shocks when domestic insulation 
policies are enforced by the exporters (Martin and Anderson, 2012).  
Against this, regional cooperation may serve as a solution to the problem. The idea of a regional 
response to food price instability based on the possibility of cost sharing and capability of timely 
intervention (Wright and Cafiero, 2011; FAO et al., 2011). Regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
encourage free trade among the members in which the governments do not restrict imports from 
or export to other member countries. However, RTAs in the past were mainly concerned with 
encouraging industrial development (Matthews, 2003). Agriculture sector is often considered as 
a sensitive issue, thus, many exceptions are applied to the sector. Incorporating agriculture into 
RTAs brings pressures in harmonizing agricultural policies and often become unresolved issue in 
the negotiations. The level of common external tariff, rules on domestic subsidies, financial 
mechanism for the farmers are among the issues that need to be addressed in the agreements. 
These issues become more complicated when the authority to set the policies are being 
transferred to supranational or regional level. 
Regional food reserve is a relatively cheap means as an alternative to national reserves (FAO et 
al., 2011). The cooperation has a direct objective to enhance food security by ensuring food 
supply.   The main function of the reserve is to provide additional supply in the case of 
emergency or abnormal market situation. Joint reserve requires an agreement on rules and 
mechanism with respect to country’s contribution and entitlement to receive stocks. The value of 
trust among participant countries becomes very high as the successful joint reserve needs 
information sharing on production, supply and stock levels. Moreover some elements of food 
sovereignty at the national level are being transferred to the regional level. 
The idea of multinational reserve has been already in place for decades. In 1933, major exporting 
countries agreed on International Wheat Agreement (IWA) to ensure supply stability. After 
global food crisis in the 1970s, the idea of regional and global grain reserves was largely 
discussed (Konandreas et al, 1978; Reutlinger et al., 1976; Johnson, 1976). In the wake of 1974 
World Food Conference, countries agreed on 500,000 tons of grain to tackle emergency situation 
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in the food crisis (Shaw, 2007). In Southeast Asia, regional reserve cooperation has started since 
1979 by the establishment of ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR).  
The motivation of countries in joining regional cooperation varies. Some countries may expect to 
benefit from releases of stocks to secure their domestic supply while other countries probably not 
intend to directly benefit from releases of stocks but to maintain their relation with the 
neighbouring countries. Political economy is highly involved in the governments’ decision to 
agree on regional mechanism. In the case of ASEAN plus three, for instance, China is unlikely to 
participate in ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) with intention to benefit 
from releases of regional stocks. APTERR stock level is just too small to secure China’s 
domestic supply. Instead, China is likely to provide assistance to other smaller participant 
countries. One important point to note is that APTERR has proven that joint reserve at the 
regional level is possible although its effectiveness in enhancing food security remains to be 
investigated. 
 
3.3. ASEAN Food Market Structure 
The recent waves of global food price crisis have affected almost all countries in the world. 
ASEAN countries are among those that are hit by the price crisis. Since 2007, the food price 
index increases have been higher than the consumer price index increases in the region (Figure 
3.1).  
Figure 3.1. Consumer Price Index and Food price index in Southeast Asia (2000=100) 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E accessed on August 18, 2015.  
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ASEAN provides a mix of cases. It is home to some of the world’s biggest producers, 
consumers, exporters and importers of rice at the same time. Thailand and Vietnam are among 
the biggest rice exporters, whereas Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are among the 
biggest rice importers in the world. However, Indonesia and the Philippines, with their goals to 
achieve self-sufficiency, view trade as the last source of supply, making them occasional rice 
importers depending on their production level. Other countries such as Singapore and Brunei are 
considered as traditional purchasers of rice.  
 
Figure 3.2. World’s rice production in 2013 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E accessed on August 18, 2015.  
The international rice market has been historically thin and unstable (Dawe and Timmer, 2012). 
The geographic concentration of rice production and the thinness of international rice trade with 
high transactions costs are among the factors contributing to its instability. Only about 5 percent 
of the total global rice production enters the international market, which is mostly concentrated 
in Asia. Southeast Asia as a region is a net rice exporter (Figure 3.3), but the bulk of the 
countries are rice importers (Table 3.1)  
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Figure 3.3. ASEAN rice trade 2007 – 2011  
 
Source: FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E accessed on August 18, 2015.  
Table 3.1. ASEAN countries’ rice trade balance 2011 (million USD) 
Country Import Export Net Import 
Brunei  39.6 2.0 37.6 
Myanmar 1.6 98.5 -96.9 
Indonesia 1513.2 0.8 1512.3 
Cambodia 4.9 107.9 -103.1 
Lao PDR 9.8 NA NA 
Malaysia 606.1 0.4 605.7 
Philippines 383.2 1.7 381.5 
Singapore 284.3 52.6 231.6 
Thailand 8.9 6507.5 -6498.6 
Vietnam 1.3 3656.8 -3655.5 
Source: FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E accessed on August 18, 2015.  
ASEAN countries’ imports are mainly sourced from within the region. The countries in this 
region absorb roughly one third of the total regional exports and send the excess rice supply to 
the rest of the world (Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.4. ASEAN rice trade flow 2011 
 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE, retrieved via http://wits.worldbank.org/ , accessed in July 2015. 
 
The average rice tariff rates of ASEAN countries are relatively high compared with other 
commodities. In 2012, the tariff for rice was 15.94 percent on average among ASEAN countries, 
which was much higher than the total average tariff rates for all commodities (Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2. Average tariff rates of ASEAN countries in 2012 (%) 
Sector Tariff rates 
All commodities  5.42 
Food commodities 7.01 
Rice 15.94 
Note: Average tariff rates not weighted, classification based on standard product in SITC 
Source: TRAINS database accessed via WITS, http://wits.worldbank.org/, retrieved in July 2015 
 
 
Southeast Asian countries liberalize their markets through regional and multilateral trade 
agreements. The cooperation through ASEAN started in 1967, and all ASEAN members are 
currently also members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through the ASEAN Trade in 
Goods Agreement (ATIGA), which supersedes the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) scheme implemented in 1992, international trade within the region is almost without 
tariffs except for certain sensitive commodities. In addition to bilateral cooperation between 
ASEAN members and many other countries, the members also build cooperation with 
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neighboring countries while maintaining ASEAN centrality (Figure 3.5). There are AK-FTA 
(with Rep. Korea), AC-FTA (with China), AANZFTA (with Australia and New Zealand) and 
AI-FTA (with India). Although the agreement of ASEAN and Japan has not yet entered into 
force, many ASEAN members have already established bilateral agreement with Japan. 
Furthermore, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which will combine 
ASEAN and their six partners, is currently under negotiation.18 ASEAN itself is entering a new 
phase of stronger cooperation through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. 
 
Figure 3.5. ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WTO 
 
However, despite having significantly reduced their tariffs on many commodities through trade 
agreements among ASEAN members (and plus countries), considerably high cereals tariffs are 
still in place (Table 3.3). Cereal products, especially rice, are considered highly sensitive 
commodities in ASEAN, and thus ASEAN countries still make exceptions by not reducing the 
tariff on these commodities.  
                                                            
18  RCEP  participating  countries  are  ASEAN  countries  (Brunei,  Burma,  Cambodia,  Indonesia,  Laos,  Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam) plus their six partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and 
South Korea), launched in November 2012. 
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Table 3.3. Tariff of selected agricultural product of different trade agreement regimes 2012 (%) 
Commodity  MFN applied 
ATIGA AK 
FTA 
AC 
FTA 
AANZ 
FTA 
AI 
FTA 
Animals & product  4.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8 2.2 
Dairy products  5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.2 
Fruit, vegetables & plants  5.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 3.8 
Coffee & Tea  6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 4.3 
Cereals  11.8 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.7 10.1 
Oil seeds, fats & oils 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.3 
Sugar  12.8 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 10.4 
Cotton  4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 
Other agriculture products  4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.4 
Source: WTO 
Note: MFN-Most Favoured Nations, ATIGA – ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, AK FTA – ASEAN Korea FTA, 
AC FTA – ASEAN China FTA, AANZFTA – ASEAN Australia New Zealand FTA, AI FTA – ASEAN India FTA. 
 
3.4. National Food Reserves in Southeast Asia 
The fact that the international rice market has been historically thin and unstable forced countries 
in this region to prevent the transmission of world price fluctuations to domestic markets (Dawe 
and Timmer, 2012; Rashid et. al, 2006). Storage-based public intervention policies have been 
part of their development agenda for many years to control food availability in the market.  
Food price stabilization in the Philippines is managed by the National Food Authority (NFA), 
which acts as a regulator as well as a corporation engaged in grain trading. The history of the 
NFA started in the 1960s, when the RICOB and the RCA were still active. In 1972, the National 
Grains Authority (NGA) replaced these two agencies to promote the integrated growth and 
development of the grain industry in the country. In 1981, the NGA was transformed to the NFA, 
and the new organization has two primary mandates: ensuring food security and stabilizing the 
supply and price of rice. This highlighted the importance of rice in the society. The NFA aimed 
to fulfill its mandates through procurement, distribution, importation and buffer stock activities. 
For the buffer stock activities, the NFA is required to maintain rice stocks which are equivalent 
to 15 days of consumption for the entire country in its warehouses (Aquino, et al., 2013). 
In Indonesia, price stabilization was managed by BULOG, a national food reserve agency 
created in 1967 with the special objective to protect Indonesian domestic markets from sharp 
price fluctuations on world markets. BULOG buys excess rice production that is not absorbed by 
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the market during harvest seasons from farmers, keeps the rice in its warehouses throughout the 
country, and distributes the rice at low prices during planting seasons, drought or other 
conditions that may cause sharp increases in market rice prices. BULOG maintains a ceiling 
price policy to ensure the affordability of rice for low-income consumers, especially those living 
in urban areas. Like the NFA in the Philippines, BULOG also monopolizes rice imports in 
Indonesia. 
As rice importers, Indonesia and the Philippines mainly control rice imports. Other countries, 
such as Vietnam, which is an exporter country, also use public reserve policies to control rice 
exports. VINAFOOD in Vietnam is responsible for managing rice availability and rice prices in 
the market. 
 
3.4.1. The Benefits and Costs of National Reserves 
Although it is difficult to separate the contributions of policies, the study has provided some 
reviews and discussions on the costs and benefits of national food reserve using qualitative 
approaches. Rashid et al. (2006) argued that storage-based price stabilization policies benefit 
countries through price stability and better agricultural performance. Southeast Asian countries 
were among those that successfully managed their domestic food prices for years. Under the 
“New Order”,  Indonesia was one of the success stories of food price stabilization, especially for 
rice. From 1969 to 1997, domestic rice prices were substantially less volatile than in the 
“reform”  period after 1998, when BULOG has less power to intervene in the market  (see Figure 
3.6). In Vietnam, agricultural policies introduced in the early phase of the unification of North 
and South Vietnam have transformed the country with disappointing agricultural production to 
one of the biggest rice exporters in the world.  
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Figure 3.6. Rice prices in Indonesia during “New Order” and Reform" 
 
Source: Dawe (2008) and GIEWS 
 
Price stability benefits consumers and producers at the same time (Timmer, 1989). Poor 
consumers in Southeast Asia, like many others in developing countries, spend more than half of 
their income on food (von Braun and Tadesse, 2012). Excessive price volatility and spikes can 
cause food and nutrition insecurity for those consumers who cannot maintain consumption 
stability. Reducing food and nutrition intake, even only temporarily, can have short- and long-
term effects (Block et al., 2004). Price stabilization policy serves as a preventive program instead 
of a response program for emergency cases. This kind of policy can help consumers better 
manage their expectations on food prices and thus better manage their food and nutritional 
intake. Price stability also helps producers maintain consumption stability because most farmers 
in Southeast Asia are also categorized as poor citizen living in rural areas.  
Furthermore, price stability allows farmers to better manage price expectations on food crops, 
which can enhance efficiency in the farming sector through better management of planting 
systems. Moreover, price stability contributes to social and political stability. Arezki and 
Brückner (2014) showed that price movements can induce political instability, which is 
manifested in political riots and civil conflicts. Sociopolitical instability can in turn make it 
difficult for governments to promote growth and development.  
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
Ja
n‐6
9
De
c‐7
0
N
ov
‐72
O
ct
‐74
Se
p‐7
6
Au
g‐7
8
Ju
l‐8
0
Ju
n‐8
2
M
ay
‐84
Ap
r‐8
6
M
ar
‐88
Fe
b‐9
0
Ja
n‐9
2
De
c‐9
3
N
ov
‐95
O
ct
‐97
Se
p‐9
9
Au
g‐0
1
Ju
l‐0
3
Ju
n‐0
5
M
ay
‐07
Ap
r‐0
9
M
ar
‐11
Domestic
World
New Order  Reform 
52 
 
Food price stability is in fact associated with the rapid economic growth during the early 
development phase in Southeast Asia (Dawe and Timmer, 2012, Cummings et al., 2006). 
However, the downside of stabilization policies are that the fiscal costs of public reserves are 
often high, while the benefits may not be as high as expected. In the Philippines for instance, the 
government spending on the NFA surpassed its spending on agrarian reform, research and 
development, and extension services during the period of 2003-2008 (Aquino et al., 2013). In 
Indonesia, a financial audit report by Arthur Anderson covering the period from April 1993 to 
March 1998 suggested that total inefficiency of BULOG was about 400 million USD per year 
(Arifin, 2008). Likewise, the economic costs of distorting market and crowding out private 
storage and trade can also be very high. 
Over decades, there have been several shifts in the price stabilization policies in Southeast Asia. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, public reserves fell out of favor particularly because of the changing 
interest of many countries, which wanted to improve market efficiency. Fiscal difficulties caused 
by the Asian crisis in the late 1990s triggered countries in the region to intervene less in the 
market. Indonesia loosened its monopolistic structure and created competition within the 
domestic market. BULOG lost its domestic power to monopolize the sugar and rice trade 
because Indonesia was required to comply with the International Monetary Foundation (IMF) 
Letter of Intent by liberalizing its market. 
 
3.5. Regional Food Reserve Cooperation 
Following the global food price crisis in 2008, ASEAN countries agreed on the ASEAN 
Integrated Food Security (AIFS) framework, which aimed to address four major components of 
the food security challenges: food security arrangements and emergency short-term relief, 
sustainable food trade development, integrated food security information system, and agricultural 
innovation. The AIFS framework provides the foundation for the establishment of the APTERR, 
an ASEAN regional reserve cooperation together with its three partners.  The APTERR was 
finally agreed upon in October 2011 and entered into force in July 2012.  
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The history of the APTERR dates back to 1979, when the original members of ASEAN  agreed 
on the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR). The objective was to build up physical rice 
reserves that would serve the needs of member countries when the demand in any member 
country cannot be fulfilled from own production or through purchases in international market. 
The main reason for the cooperation was that the ASEAN countries identified food instability as 
a common threat and as the consequence of the high vulnerability of the region’s food 
production. The AERR was created with the initial earmarks of 50,000 tons of rice as a subset of 
national stocks. Releases from the AERR were to be arranged through bilateral negotiation 
between a country in a state of emergency and a country offering its earmarked reserve. The 
system, however, was never used, and the amount of rice in the reserve was too undersized to 
cope with an actual emergency.  
The efforts of building up stocks in the region continued. In 2001, ASEAN countries, in 
partnership with China, Japan and Korea, initiated a consultation and cooperation process in 
establishing an emergency rice reserve at the regional level. A pilot project of the East Asia 
Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR) was created at the end of 2003 with the political support of 
the ASEAN Plus Three countries. The purpose of the EAERR is twofold: maintaining food 
security in case of emergency and contributing toward price stability in the region (APTERR, 
2014). The food price crisis in 2008 led the ASEAN Plus Three governments to strengthen the 
financial and stockpiling abilities of the EAERR and move beyond the project beyond its pilot 
phase. The APTERR was finally agreed upon as a permanent scheme in October 2011 and 
entered into force in July 2012.  
The initial earmarked stock of the APTERR is 787,000 tons of rice, which were voluntarily 
contributed by the member countries (Table 3.4). The stocks remain owned and controlled by the 
respective governments for meeting the needs of any other member countries in case of 
emergency. The governments are also responsible for the management cost of their earmarked 
stocks to ensure the stocks remain in good quality. Another type of APTERR stock is a 
stockpiled emergency rice reserve, which could be in form of cash or rice, but is owned 
collectively by APTERR member countries and managed by the APTERR secretariat under the 
supervision of the APTERR council.  
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Table 3.4. Earmarked Stock of APTERR 
Country Earmarked stocks (tons) 
ASEAN Countries  
Brunei Darussalam 3,000 
Cambodia 3,000 
Indonesia 12,000 
Lao PDR 3,000 
Malaysia 6,000 
Myanmar 14,000 
Philippines 12,000 
Singapore 5,000 
Thailand 15,000 
Vietnam 14,000 
Plus Three Countries  
China 300,000 
Japan 250,000 
Korea 150,000 
TOTAL 787,000 
Source: APTERR 
 
The APTERR is designed to mainly address emergency situations anywhere in the region. 
Emergency is defined as “the state or condition having suffered extreme and unexpected natural 
or man‐induced calamity, which is unable to cope with such state or condition through its 
national reserve and is unable to procure the need through normal trade”.19 In principle, given the 
definition of emergency, extreme price volatility is not a reason for releasing rice from the 
APTERR.  
The APTERR presents itself as a subset of national reserves. Rice release from the APTERR is 
only possible when a national reserve is unable to cope with extreme shocks. The release of 
APTERR stock is based on the request of the member country which encounters an emergency 
rice shortage. The requesting country is also responsible for the transportation and operational 
costs incurred during the stock release.  
                                                            
19 ASEAN Integrated Food Security Framework. 
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The APTERR heavily relies on the commitment and political will of every member country, 
without any sanction mechanism in place. Nevertheless, APTERR member countries appoint a 
Management Team to ensure rice releases take place in case of emergency. 
 
3.5.1. The Benefits and Costs of Regional Reserves 
There have been extensive debates on storage-based price stabilization policies (Galtier, 2013). 
On the one hand, countries with public reserve policies can benefit from price stability and better 
agriculture performances, which are associated with economic success. On the other hand, the 
policies are often criticized for their high fiscal and economic costs. 
National public food reserves in Southeast Asia are largely managed as buffer stocks to address 
price instability. The size of national public food reserves is usually large, and their stocks are 
frequently rotated to maintain the quality of the stocks. Consequently, the fiscal costs of storing 
food/grains are high, and the potential of creating market distortion is high as a result of the high 
degree of intervention. On the other hand, an emergency public reserve usually holds a low 
amount of stocks and is only intended for addressing humanitarian needs rather than for price 
stabilization.  
In the competitive storage model, the central idea behind storing food today for tomorrow’s 
consumption is based on the assumption that an equilibrium price can be reached when today’s 
price (݌௧) equals the expected price tomorrow (݌௧ାଵ) plus the costs of storage. Stocks are held in 
anticipation of profit, which implies that the marginal gain of holding stocks should exceed the 
marginal cost. However, under this condition, the optimal stock level is not necessarily optimal 
from the social welfare perspective.  
Using this assumption, public involvement in stockholding is needed to address the economy-
wide consequences of demand or supply shocks. Difficulties arise when determining the optimal 
stock level (Gardner, 1979) as it depends on the criterion of desirability. For instance, public rice 
stocks maintained by the NFA in the Philippines are equivalent to 15-day consumption needs of 
the entire country (Aquino, et al., 2013). This stock level is determined based on the assumption 
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that the national stock level (public and private) should be equivalent to the 90-day consumption 
needs, which covers the lean season, when usually no harvests from domestic production prevail. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in determining the optimal stock level, we provided an 
illustration on how regional cooperation can significantly reduce the required stocks.20 Following 
Kornher and Kalkuhl (2014), the study estimated the required stocks as the difference between 
the largest historic supply shortfall and the percentage of threshold:  
ܵ ൌ max ቂቀ1 െ	 ௫ଵ଴଴ቁ ܧሺܳ௧ሻ െ	ܳ௧ቃ    (1) 
where x is the level of allowed supply shortfall. For instance, if we want to maintain 97 percent 
consumption stability, then the allowed supply shortfall is 3 percent. ܧሺܳ௧ሻ	is the expected 
supply level at time t. Since supply for consumption increases with population growth, the study 
measured shortfall around a trend. 
Supply shortfalls of countries individually were compared with the total supply shortfalls of the 
entire region using the coefficient of variation of supply, which can be written as: 
ܥܸଶሺ∑ ܳ௜ሻ ൌ 	∑ ݏ௜ଶ	ܥܸ	ሺܳ௜ሻ ൅ 	2∑ ∑ ݏ௜ݏ௜ ൅ 1	ݎ௜,௜ାଵ௡௜ାଵ௡ଵ௡ଵ௡ଵ 	ܥܸሺܳ௜ሻܥܸሺܳ௜ାଵሻ  (2) 
where ܥܸଶሺ∑ ܳ௜ሻ௡ଵ  is the coefficient of variation of the regional supply, and 	ܳ௜ is the supply of 
each country. si and ݎ௜,௜ାଵ	are a country’s share and coefficient of correlation respectively. This 
condition assumes that there is free flow of food between the countries within the region. 
Production shortfall can be compensated by imports, which means that the supply shortfall in 
one country can be compensated by supply surpluses in other countries. 
Considering that not all of ASEAN countries are rice producers, supply data (production + 
imports) was used instead of production data only. Rice supply in Singapore, for instance, relies 
heavily on imports. Using the actual rice supply data of ASEAN+3 countries from the USDA 
PSD for the period of 1980-2014, we estimated the required stocks for the two-month 
consumption stability at 97 percent (allowed supply shortfall of 3%). Countries’ stocks were 
                                                            
20 Further discussion on optimal stock level can be found in Kornher and Kalkuhl (2014) 
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determined from the regional stocks using their consumption shares. The results of the 
estimations are presented in Table 3.5.21 
 
Table 3.5. Stocks required for allowed supply shortfall of 3% (tons) 
 w/o cooperation with cooperation Actual APTERR stock 
 required 
stock 
stock-to-
use ratio 
required 
stock 
Stock-to-
use ratio 
earmarked 
stock 
stock-to-
use ratio 
ASEAN       
Brunei 1227 23.22 688 13.02 3000 56.76 
Cambodia 47768 12.95 26799 7.27 3000 0.81 
Indonesia 57413 1.05 32210 0.59 12000 0.22 
Lao PDR 18912 10.73 10610 6.02 3000 1.7 
Malaysia 17947 5.59 10069 3.14 6000 1.87 
Myanmar 34552 2.37 19385 1.33 14000 0.96 
Philippines 78355 5.41 43960 3.04 12000 0.83 
Singapore 10420 23.28 5846 13.06 5000 11.17 
Thailand 130132 8.60 73008 4.82 15000 0.99 
Vietnam 136657 5.42 76669 3.04 14000 0.55 
Plus Three       
China 678268 3.2 380533 1.8 300000 1.42 
Japan 132280 8.7 74214 4.88 250000 16.45 
Korea 59788 6.93 33543 3.90 150000 17.40 
Total 1403717 3.81 787535 2.14 787000 2.14 
Source: Own elaboration based on USDA PSD 
Note: required stocks w/o cooperation and with cooperation are calculated for two months consumption 
 
 
The simulations showed that regional cooperation can significantly reduce the required rice stock 
by roughly 44 percent, from 1,403,717 tons to 787,535 tons. This implies that the fiscal costs 
associated with holding stocks can be reduced through cooperation and risks sharing. The 
simulations also showed that all countries can reduce the required contributions of stocks 
through regional risk sharing. 
                                                            
21 Correlation matrix of supply shortfall, maximum shortfall, average annual supply and consumption shares that were used for the 
estimations are available in appendix. 
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In the APTERR system, stocks remain owned and controlled by the respective governments for 
the purpose of meeting the needs of any other APTERR member countries when they experience 
an emergency. However, transportation costs arise when transferring rice from a donor country 
to a country in need. This transportation costs should also be taken into consideration when 
calculating the cost reduction resulting from cooperation. Since transportation costs arise only 
when a country within the region experiences a shortfall, we calculated the transportation costs 
from the expected trade volume in times of shortfall, which was estimated to be equal to the 
required stocks for two months consumption. The results are available in Table 3.6.  
 
Table 3.6. Storage and transportation costs (million USD) 
 storage cost transportation cost total cost 
 low high low high low high 
w/o cooperation 35 49 - - 35 49 
with cooperation 20 28 0.7 1.1 20.7 29.1 
cost savings     14.3 19.9 
Note: Storage cost is estimated in the range of USD 25 (low) to USD 35 (high) per ton. Transportation cost within 
ASEAN+3 countries is estimated in the range of USD 10 (low) to 15 (high) per ton.  
Source: own elaboration 
 
The total cost saving through food reserve cooperation was estimated to be about 14.3 to 19.9 
million USD when storing enough food to satisfy consumption for two months. The saving is 
roughly 40 percent of the estimated cost without cooperation.  
The current APTERR stock is roughly equal to the total stocks needed by the region to maintain 
consumption stability at 97 percent for two months. However, the voluntary contribution of each 
member country of the APTERR is not the same as the required stock for each country with 
cooperation through risks sharing. For instance, Japan and Korea contribute more than what they 
need, but Cambodia and Lao PDR contribute less than their required stocks. Richer countries of 
the APTERR are more likely to provide food assistance to their poorer neighboring countries. 
This can be seen also from the voluntary contributions of APTERR member countries: each of 
the “Plus Three” countries contribute more than the total contribution from all ASEAN countries. 
There is a strong indication that the large contribution from the “Plus Three” countries has 
brought APTERR into practice. Its predecessor, the AERR, which consisted only of ASEAN 
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members with small size of stock, had never released its stock during its entire operational 
period. 
The study also conducted a simulation to determine the required stock for ensuring consumption 
stability of 97 percent in different cooperation regimes in order to analyze whether countries 
benefit from larger cooperation (Table 3.7). Through simulation of three scenarios–ASEAN, 
ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+3 plus India–the study found that the benefits of cooperation decreased 
when more countries joined the cooperation. This is possible because the correlation of shortfall 
risks increases with the increasing number of member countries. However, although the benefits 
of cooperation was decreasing, the required stock was still significantly reduced. For instance, if 
India also joined the ASEAN+3 cooperation, the required stock would be reduced by 31 percent. 
Moreover, larger cooperation means larger coordination between countries, which can 
potentially prevent collective action failures. 
 
 
Table 3.7. Stocks required for allowed supply shortfall of 3% in different cooperation  
     regimes (tons) 
Regional cooperation  
(simulation) 
Required stocks 
without 
cooperation 
Required stocks 
with cooperation Reduced by 
ASEAN 533382 178885 66% 
ASEAN+3 1403717 787535 44% 
ASEAN+3+India 2362418 1637777 31% 
Source: Own elaboration based on USDA PSD 
 
 
3.6. WTO Rules on Public Reserve 
The central issue in a WTO-compatible framework for developing countries, including those in 
Southeast Asia, is whether these countries are able to stockpile their staple food (i.e., rice) to 
ensure stable incomes for their farmers while ensuring that their low-income citizens are able to 
access the basic food at an affordable price. This issue, however, affects or has the potential to 
affect other countries. The potential spillovers of public reserves are high in different member 
countries due to different conditions of countries in ensuring food security for the citizens. The 
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increasing demand for food for stockholding purposes increases prices and potentially reduces 
supply for immediate consumption in other countries. When food stocks are finally released for 
consumption, international trade can be distorted, affecting market competition.  
The present WTO rules allow member countries to maintain or introduce domestic support 
measures without any limitations or reduction commitments. To qualify for this, domestic 
support to food reserves must meet “the fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most 
minimal, trade distorting effect or effects on production”.  Countries, however, may argue the 
definition of minimal trade distorting effects. 
A public reserve is not only economically complex but also politically encumbered. The Bali 
Package, which has been mentioned as the first-ever agreement reached in the history of the 
WTO, still makes an exception for public stockholding. In the 9th ministerial meeting held in 
Bali, Indonesia, at the end of 2013, the WTO member countries adopted an interim solution and 
agreed to negotiate a permanent solution that would specifically address public reserve by the 
11th ministerial meeting in 2017. Furthermore, in the Post-Bali work, countries also agreed to 
continue with the interim solution if the permanent solution cannot be agreed upon by 2017. This 
means that no agreement has been reached for a public reserve. Nevertheless, the interim 
solution, which should prevent countries from challenging other countries through dispute 
settlement mechanism until a permanent solution is found, can be a starting point for a new 
institutional arrangement to prevent collective action failures of uncoordinated national public 
reserves, which can further destabilize prices at the international level. 
 
3.7. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
Public food reserve policies have been used by many countries for decades. Although in the 
1980s and 1990s public reserves fell into disfavor particularly with changing interest of many 
countries to improve market efficiency, the policy has always been part of the development 
agenda in many countries. Storage-based stabilization policy through public food reserve 
receives much more attention today in the era of increasing food price volatility. Food security 
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concerns in the recent years have led many countries to reconsider public food reserve as the 
main policy to deal with such uncertainty and price instability.  
ASEAN countries provide an interesting case with their long experience in storage-based price 
stabilization policies. Albeit difficulties to measuring the impact of different policies, price 
stabilization in fact has been an integral part of their development agenda for decades and 
contributes to price stability which is associated with economic successes in this region.  
ASEAN also shows that cooperation at the regional level is possible. APTERR presents as 
regional effort to face common challenges in ensuring food security.  
One of the main concerns of public reserve is that the fiscal cost needed to store the food is 
relatively high. The cost, however, can be reduced with cooperation. Simulations show that 
regional cooperation significantly reduces the required stocks which will definitely reduce the 
costs of holding them. When transportation cost is also added in due to the decentralized storage 
in the different countries, the total cost for food reserve with cooperation is still lower than food 
reserve without cooperation. This definitely will be beneficial for all participating countries.  
ASEAN and their partner countries can also consider expanding the cooperation that may 
include other neighboring countries. Simulation with India as the “fourth” country shows that the 
cooperation still significantly reduces the required stocks that will be beneficial for all member 
countries involved. India is emphasized in the simulation for its important role in the region. The 
fact that the country is home to around 200 million undernourished people22, has brought serious 
concerns to the policy makers in the country. With the world’s largest food programs covering 
public procurement, storage and distribution of wheat and rice, India has been successfully 
stabilized its food prices for many years. However, the policies run at the very high fiscal cost. In 
2013, the cost is estimated around 1.2 percent of GDP (Kozicka, et. al., 2015).  
Yet, India is not part of ASEAN plus three countries food reserve cooperation. However, 
ASEAN and India has already an FTA which entered into force since January 2010. The 
countries involved can also consider bringing food reserve as part of their cooperation which will 
likely bring benefits to all participant countries. In addition to reduce the fiscal costs, larger 
cooperation and coordination also means that collective actions failures are diminished.  
                                                            
22 Estimated from 17 percent of population as stated in the Global Hunger Index, IFPRI et. al., 2014. 
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Learn from ASEAN case, public food reserve is an ancient idea that meets its relevance today. 
The way forward is to build institutional arrangements that accommodate coordination and 
cooperation among countries, including through the multilateral trading system of the WTO. 
Each of ASEAN trade agreements with six countries23 which might go further under Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) framework that combines all ASEAN “plus” 
agreements can be a starting point for a stronger and larger cooperation including in public 
reserves.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
23 The six countries are Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand. 
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Chapter 4. Do the WTO and RTAs Promote Food Trade? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
After more than a decade of deadlock in the negotiations of Doha Development Agenda, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) has gained a noteworthy momentum by the success of the 
Ninth Ministerial Meeting at the end of 2013. The first-ever multilateral trade agreements since 
the formation of the WTO and approved by all member countries have been reached in Bali 
Indonesia. However, countries are still struggling to find permanent solution on public 
stockholding for food security issues, confirming that food remains a very sensitive sector in the 
agreement.24  
On the other hand, the world has seen a remarkable proliferation of regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) in the last two decades, growing from only less than 40 in 1990 to nearly 400 that were 
in force in 2013. The data suggest that almost all WTO members are participating in one or more 
regional trade agreements. These figures result in very complicated overlapping trade relations 
among countries (Figure 4.1). The term “Spaghetti Bowl” has been widely used by trade 
researcher and practitioner to describe global trade relations.  
One issue often raised is whether these agreements can play a positive role in strengthening food 
security at the worldwide level. “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have access 
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life”25.  An important key factor relates to this definition of food security is 
physical availability of food at all times in all places. Economic means to access food will be 
meaningless when food is not available. Certain geographies in the global world are endowed by 
natural resources needed to produce surplus food, while some others deficit because they have 
more demand than food that they can produce. Global imbalances occur since high population is 
                                                            
24 At the 9th WTO ministerial meeting in Bali, December 2013, member countries agreed on an interim solution of 
public stockholding for food security purposes until permanent solution is found by 2017. In the post-Bali work, 
India blocked Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) requesting to delete the time limit of 2017. In November 2014, 
member countries agreed that if the permanent solution cannot be found by 2017, the interim solution remains.   
25 1996 World Food Summit 
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not associated with high food production (Figure 4.2). Food security at the global level is only 
possible when food can move freely from areas of surplus to areas of deficit.  
 
Figure 4.1. Global map of trade agreements as of 2013 
 
Note: Countries’ geographical positions are placed as in normal map but without scaling, ISO alpha 2 codes can be accessed via 
http://www.iso.org/iso/country_codes 
Source: Own illustration based on WTO database 
 
In the light of the recent excessive food price volatility since 2007-08, in which international 
trade distortions have been found to be among the main key drivers of the food price crises 
(Martin and Anderson, 2012; von Braun and Tadesse, 2012; World Bank, 2010), it is highly 
important to analyze whether trade agreements may contribute to reduce trade distortions and 
could bring the world to a freer flow of food by increasing food trade among countries. 
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Figure 4.2. Population and cereal production in 2012 
 
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
 
Trade agreements are usually based on the commitments to reduce market barriers for all trade 
sectors among participant countries. Food is an integral part of these agreements as usually no 
important sector is omitted. However, as these agreements are subject to negotiation, they are 
substantially varied in scope and depth. The agreements to reduce the so-called bound tariff rates 
may or may not affect market access, depending on the gap between the bound rates and the 
tariffs that a country actually applies to imports. In addition, non-tariff measures (NTMs) are 
often used to protect countries’ interests in some sectors including food. Therefore, the impact of 
trade agreements on food trade is an empirical question. Despite the fact that this appears to be a 
very relevant issue, to date there is rather poor empirical evidence on the impact of trade 
agreements on food trade. Most studies on trade agreements both at the multilateral and at the 
regional level are usually based on aggregate trade, without exclusively looking at the food 
sector.  
This chapter contributes to the literature in two-folds. First, although a number of studies have 
addressed the impacts of WTO and RTA membership on agricultural trade, only very few to 
none of the studies found in the literature exclusively analysed the impact of trade agreement on 
food trade, which will be the main focus of this chapter. Second, unlike most studies which 
usually focus on one of the multilateral or regional institutions, this chapter brings the WTO and 
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RTAs together in one analysis to compare their impacts on food trade. Using gravity model of 
international trade, the discussions framework built in this chapter is simply to answer whether 
the establishments of the WTO and RTAs have facilitated food trade among the participant 
countries.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of 
previous studies on the impacts of the WTO and RTA membership on trade flow. Section 4.3 
follows by providing background information on trade agreements, market access and food trade. 
Section 4.4 discusses the theoretical framework followed by section 4.5 which describes model 
specification, data description and results discussion. Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2. Previous Studies on the Impacts of Trade Agreements on Trade 
Many studies on the impacts of trade agreements on trade flow have come naturally to the use of 
gravity model, one of the most successful trade analysis device offered in the literature 
(Anderson, 1979). Among others, Rose (2004), Subramanian and Wei (2007), Grant and Boys 
(2012), Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Sun and Reed (2010) are among the few careful 
empirical studies using gravity model to analyse the impact of multilateral and regional trade 
agreements on trade of the participant countries. While the first three studies mentioned above 
focused on the WTO, the interests of the latter two are on regional trade agreements.  
Prior to Rose (2004), the WTO is often considered as one of the most successful multilateral 
institution in the modern economy (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002). Contrary to much of 
conventional believes, Rose (2004) claims that the members of the WTO do not trade more than 
the non-members. The study was based on a standard gravity model of international trade 
covering the periods over 50 years and 175 countries. Rose’s influential article embarks a 
growing body of literature that empirically analyze the impact of the WTO membership on 
members’ trade. The findings of the studies are varied and sometimes come with conflicting 
results.  While Rose (2004) claims no evidence that the WTO enhance trade among the 
members, Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007) found the opposite. They reversed Rose’s findings 
by shifting the focus on formal membership to informal participation. Their argument is based on 
the right and obligation of the trade institutions that are not only for contracting parties but also 
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for colonies, newly independent states and provisional members. However, the study cannot 
explain why informal participation does have larger effect than the formal members (Rose, 
2007). 
Subramanian and Wei (2007) found that the WTO promotes trade “strongly”, but only for 
industrialized countries. Their analysis is based on the asymmetric structure of the WTO by 
focusing only on the countries and products that are covered by the WTO liberalization. They 
argue that the developing countries experience very little trade increase because they have 
special and differential treatment. Subramanian and Wei (2007) also report that the WTO has 
negative implication on agricultural trade. Another study that analyze the impacts of the WTO 
membership on agricultural and non-agricultural trade flows is Grant and Boys (2012). Their 
study employs the recent advances in the gravity model specification and found that the WTO 
has delivered significant positive impacts on members’ trade, both for agricultural and non-
agricultural trade. 
Studies on analyzing the impacts of RTAs on members’ trade can be differentiated by two 
categories: using benchmark scenario and investigating specific RTAs. Among others, Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) is an example of the study using benchmark scenario while Sun and Reed 
(2010) investigates agricultural trade impacts of several specific RTAs. With a careful 
econometric analysis, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) show that on average RTAs have strong 
positive and significant impacts on trade flows among the members. Sun and Reed (2010) who 
analyse several RTAs found that The ASEAN-China trade agreement, European Union (EU)-15, 
EU-25, and Southern African Development Community agreements (SADC) generate large 
increases in agricultural trade among the members while no agricultural trade increases for the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
As shown by the results of the studies on trade impacts of the WTO, many of previous studies 
analyzing the impacts of RTA membership on trade have also produced different and sometimes 
conflicting results. For instance, the results of the investigation on trade effect of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) membership. Hassan (2001) found negative effect, 
Krueger (2000) found positive effect, Sharma and Chua (2000) found no trade effect associated 
with the ASEAN membership.  
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The variety and sometimes conflicting results of the studies, both for the WTO and RTAs, are 
suspected due to the different specification and sample selection used by the researchers. For 
example, Subramanian and Wei’s (2007) results on agricultural trade was based only on six 
product at the four level of Harmonized System (HS4): cabbages, frozen vegetables, margarine, 
malt extracts, tomatoes and tobacco. The results might be problematic not only because these 
products face high tariff in the world trade, but also the six products are too few to define more 
than 200 HS4 products of the agriculture sector. Moreover, recent advances in the gravity model 
specification is prime important to be applied as shown by Grant and Boys (2012). Failures to 
apply the correct model and specification may produce inconsistent results. 
 
4.3. Trade Agreements, Market Access and Food Trade 
Before discussing the theoretical framework of the gravity model used in the analysis and 
presenting the results, this section provides background information for the study. It provides 
some information on the development of trade agreements both multilateral and at the regional 
level, followed by the market access of food and global food trade. 
 
4.3.1. Trade Agreements 
Trade Agreements in the global world trade system can be distinguished by multilateral and 
regional trade agreements.  The WTO is the one and only recognized body in the multilateral 
trading system that intends to supervise international trade. The organization officially exists 
since 1995, replacing its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
which embarked in 1948. The WTO has been struggled for more than a decade to complete the 
Doha Development Agenda which was launched in 200126. The negotiations have been 
deadlocked because of the many differences between developed and developing countries mainly 
in view of some major issues including agricultural trade restriction and facilitation. Only at the 
end of 2013 was significant progress made by the negotiation. Trade facilitation agreement 
                                                            
26 Doha Development Agenda is the current WTO trade negotiation round launched at the fourth ministerial meeting 
in Doha, Qatar November 2001 
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known as “Bali Package” was adopted in the Ninth Ministerial Meeting hosted by Indonesia, and 
thus, the first multilateral agreements approved by all member countries have been finally 
reached in the history of the WTO.  
While the principle of non-discrimination in trade is central to multilateral trade system under the 
GATT/WTO system, member countries are permitted to enter RTAs to promote free trade 
among members as long as these agreements do not raise barriers to non-members27. However, 
RTAs have had controversial role, some argue that the enormous number of RTAs has been 
hampering multilateral trade negotiation (Levy, 1997), while some others believe that RTAs 
have positive effects toward freer multilateral trade (Freund, 2000; Ornelas, 2005). 
Regional trade agreements s come in variety of types and forms based on the scope and depth. 
The most common type of the agreement is free trade agreement, which is a commitment among 
participant countries to remove tariffs across members while continuing to maintain their own 
tariff regimes to other countries that are not members of the agreement. Another type of the 
agreement is customs union which goes one step further by uniting tariff regimes. Beyond 
customs union is a common market which allows not only free flow of goods but also other 
factors of production i.e. labor and capital. A common market with monetary union is generally 
referred as an economic union. However, even though there are some distinctions between these 
agreements, the borderlines between those definitions are somehow blurred in practice and 
depend on the settings agreed by all participant countries.  
As of January 2014, there have been 583 regional trade agreements notified to the WTO, 377 of 
them were in force28. Figure 4.3 shows that the numbers of regional trade agreements have been 
growing sharply since early 1990s, and even more accelerated since early 2000s. The agreement 
formation among countries has gone beyond only with neighboring countries and their only 
natural trading partners, often cross continents. European Union – Papua New Guinea, US – 
Australia, Japan – Switzerland are among a few mentioned trade agreements that have been 
formed among countries or entities from different continents.  
 
 
                                                            
27 GATT, Article XXIV 
28 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, accessed on March 17th 2014 
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Figure 4.3. Numbers of regional trade agreements 1960 – 2013 
 
 
Source: Author illustration based on WTO database 
 
4.3.2. Market Access 
Most of trade agreements are based on the commitments of member countries to reduce market 
barriers. For example, the 1995 Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) of the WTO required 36 
percent average tariff reduction by developed countries with a minimum per tariff line reduction 
of 15 percent over six years. Developing countries are required to reduce their tariffs by 24 
percent on average with a minimum per tariff line reduction of 10 percent over 10 years. Least 
developed countries were exempted from tariff reductions, but had to either convert their NTMs 
to tariffs or bind their tariffs and creates a ceiling which cannot be increased in the future.29   
Tariff reduction schedules of RTAs are varied depend on their settings. However, most of these 
agreements have contributed to tariff reductions across products and countries. Fulponi et al., 
(2011) discover that in addition to WTO-AoA, RTAs have a significant impact on tariffs 
elimination in agricultural products. Their investigation found that on average over products and 
concessions, 90 percent of tariff lines are duty-free at the end of RTA implementation period. 
                                                            
29 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm, accessed March 17th, 2014. 
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Table 4.1. Average tariff rates of different sectors  
Sector 
Tariff Rates 
1992 2012 
All Sectors 13.06 6.74 
Manufactures 13.21 6.49 
Agriculture 13.28 10.24 
Textiles 17.21 10.06 
Food 14.55 11.55 
Note: Average tariff rates not weighted, classification based on standard product in SITC 
Source: TRAINS database accessed via WITS 
 
All countries have been found to reduce their tariffs on average for all sectors including food 
(Table 4.1). However, food is always among the highly restrictive sectors in international trade.  
In 2012, the simple average applied tariff rate of food for all countries is 11.55 percent, which 
has been reduced from 14.55 percent in 1992. This tariff reduction is relatively lower compared 
to other sectors. For textiles, for example, the tariffs on average have been reduced from 17.21 
percent in 1992 to 10.06 percent in 2012.  
Surprisingly, Low Income Countries (LIC) have contributed the most to the food tariff reduction 
(Figure 4.4). This country group has significantly reduced their tariffs on food from 24 percent in 
1992 to 10 percent in 2012 on average. The fact is interesting since least developed countries are 
exempted from tariff reduction in the WTO-AoA. 
Average applied tariff rates of food are found to have decreased over years for all country 
groups, except for high-income countries (HIC) which remain 8 percent in 1992 and 2012. Their 
applied food tariff rates have been already low compared to other country groups. Upper middle-
income countries (UMIC) have reduced their applied food tariff rates from 20 percent in 1992 to 
15 percent in 2012 on average, while lower middle-income countries (LMIC) are found to have 
reduced applied food tariff rates from 24 percent in 1992 to 16 percent in 2012 on average. 
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Figure 4.4. Food tariff rates evolution 1992 - 2012  
 
Note: Average tariff rates not weighted of country groups based on level of income facing all countries. HIC (High Income 
Countries); UMIC (Upper Middle Income Countries); LMIC (Lower Middle Income Countries); LIC (Lower Income Countries)  
Source: TRAINS database accessed via WITS 
 
There are also a number of policy measures other than tariffs that may affect trade flow between 
countries. These policy measures are usually categorized as non-tariff measures (NTMs) and are 
described as the following: 
 
Table 4.2. International classification of non-tariff measures 
A Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
B Technical barriers to trade 
C Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities 
D Price control measures 
E Licenses, quotas, prohibitions ad other quantity control measures 
F Charges, taxes and other para-tariff measures 
G Finance measures 
H Anti-competitive measures 
I Trade-related investment measures 
J Distribution restrictions 
K Restrictions on post-sales services 
L Subsidies (excluding export subsidies) 
M Government procurement restrictions 
N Intellectual property 
O Rules of origin 
P Export-related measures 
Source: UNCTAD 
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Although quantitative studies continue to evaluate trade based on tariffs as trade barriers, much 
attention has now shifted to NTMs. However, data on NTMs are less transparent compared to 
tariffs; thus, it is more difficult to evaluate.  The most important is to analyze what have been the 
impacts of NTMs on the trade flow. Thus, the analysis can be directly addressed at the trade 
flows among countries. 
 
4.3.3. Food Trade 
Trade plays an important role in the food equation of most countries. It can be alternative when 
supply of food from own production does not meet demand because the inelastic nature of food 
production can only respond slowly to increasing demand (Haile et al., 2013). Food trade is also 
the source of income for many countries, especially for the main food producer countries.  
Figure 4.5. Shares of food in total trade  
 
Note: HIC (High Income Countries); UMIC (Upper Middle Income Countries); LMIC (Lower Middle Income Countries); LIC 
(Lower Income Countries) 
Source: Author calculation based on UN COMTRADE 
 
The shares of food in the total world trade are relatively small and remain stable over years at 
about 8 percent in 2001 and in 2012 (Figure 4.5). The highest shares of food in the total trade are 
found for LIC which account for 21 percent in 2001 and have decreased to 17 percent in 2012. 
The shares’ decrease is not because LIC trade less food, but their trade in other sectors has 
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increased more than in food sector. This is an indication that LIC are more connected to the 
world trade system. Change in shares of food in the total trade is also the case for HIC have 
higher food shares in 2012 compared to 2001. Other country groups’ shares remain stable across 
years at 8 and 13 percent for UMIC and LMIC, respectively. 
The total value of the world food trade in 2012 is USD 2.6 billion30. HIC have the highest shares 
that account for 66 percent of the total world food trade, followed by UMIC, LMIC and LIC 
(Figure 4.6). The data show that shares of country groups in world food trade are consistent with 
their income levels. The higher the income, their shares in the world food trade are also higher. 
Although the shares of food in the total trade of LIC are relatively higher compared to those of 
other country groups, their total value accounts for only 1 percent of the world food trade.  
 
Figure 4.6. Shares of countries in world food trade  
 
Note: HIC (High Income Countries); UMIC (Upper Middle Income Countries); LMIC (Lower Middle Income Countries); LIC 
(Lower Income Countries), Source: Author calculation based on UN COMTRADE 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
30 UN COMTRADE via WITS, Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) is use to categorize food 
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4.4. Theoretical Framework 
The gravity framework that is employed in this study suggests that the patterns of trade are 
explained by the forces behind trade flows between two trading partners. The theoretical 
underpinning of the model was inspired by the Newtonian theory of gravitation, where countries 
are mutually attracted to trade just like planets that are mutually attracted in proportion to their 
sizes and proximity.  After being conceptualized for the first time by Jan Tinbergen31 in 1962, 
gravity model is considered as the workhorse of international trade with fortunate empirical 
validity. 
Initially, there was no theoretical foundation behind the econometric model used as the ex-post 
analysis of trade pattern between the two countries. One of the very first theoretical explanations 
for the gravity model was the work of Anderson (1979), which is based on a demand function 
using Armington elasticity32 where each country produces and sells goods on the international 
market that are differentiated from other goods produced in other countries. Later works have 
built gravity model in the monopolistic competition frameworks (Helpman and Krugman, 1985), 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework (Deardorff, 1998) and the Ricardian framework (Eaton and Kortum, 
2002). The gravity models work well in these multiple existing approaches, each with different 
assumptions.  
The gravity model in the Ricardian framework builds on the assumption that trade is beneficial 
due to comparative advantage. A country that is less productive in absolute terms can 
nevertheless have a comparative advantage in the production of a good by differing costs in 
production or production technologies. In the Heckscher-Ohlin, international trade occurs as a 
result of relative differences in factor endowments between countries. Countries tend to export 
goods which are produced by relatively much of their abundant factor endowments and import 
goods which are relatively manufacture-intensive. Consequently, the exported goods are 
relatively cheap to produce, whereas the imported goods are relatively expensive in production 
due to factor scarceness. The Helpman and Krugman approach assumes increasing returns to 
scale and a state of monopolistic competition between firms. The approach usually is used to 
                                                            
31 Jan Tinbergen was an economist with physics degree. He was the first Nobel Prize winner in economic science 
which he received  in 1969 together with Ragnar Frisch 
32 Armington elasticity refers to the work by Paul Armington (1969) that products traded internationally are 
differentiated by country of origin 
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explain intra-industry trade, which is the trade of products belonging to the same categories. 
Economies of scale incentivize the countries to produce selected products and trade with other 
countries producing some other products. 
International trade is basically not so much different from domestic trade as the motivation and 
behavior of traders involved do not change fundamentally regardless of whether trade is across 
national border or within a nation. The main difference is that international trade is typically 
more costly as crossing national borders usually imposes additional costs such as tariffs or other 
costs associated with country differences such as language and culture.  These additional costs 
are usually well captured in the gravity equation. The gravity model essentially explains how 
countries attracted to goods produced in other countries and this attraction is reduced by costs 
related with geographical distance and other costs associated with countries’ differences. 
Bilateral trade flows are also heavily influenced by trade agreements. In a non-discriminatory 
trade, countries are able to export their products if they are the most efficient producers and to 
import from the lowest-cost suppliers. Trade agreements change this pattern by lowering barriers 
to trade among member countries. Member countries of an agreement which could be not the 
most efficient producers might be able to export their products to other member countries simply 
because they enjoy tariff preferences in the agreements.  
Economic motivation is in particular important consideration in the choice of partner countries in 
establishing or joining an agreement. Welfare gains from trade are expected from expanding the 
market. Nevertheless, economic motivation is not always behind the deal of countries to form an 
agreement. Empirical studies suggest that the welfare effects of trade agreements can be positive 
or negative; thus, the expected benefit could be non-economic factors. Wonnacott and Lutz 
(1989) argue that political factors are also important for countries in determining with which 
countries they are likely to form trade agreements.  
Standard method to evaluate the impacts of trade agreement on bilateral trade flows is usually to 
include trade agreement as dummy variable in the right-hand side of the gravity equation. The 
direction is clear, to what extent trade agreement influences trade flows between countries. 
However, trade agreement might not be purely exogenous when one considers these economic 
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and political factors in driving countries’ choices of partners in forming or joining trade 
agreement. 
 
4.5. Model Specification 
The basic formulation of the gravity equation that will be used in the study is the following: 
  (1)         ௜ܺ௝௧௞ ൌ ߙଵ ௜ܻ௧ ൅ ߙଶ	 ௝ܻ௧ ൅	∑ ߚ௠ܼ௜௝ሺ௧ሻ௠ெ௠ୀଵ ൅ ߛ௔ܹܶ ௜ܱ௝௧ ൅ ߜ௡ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧ 
where ௜ܺ௝௧௞  is unidirectional trade33 nominal value at time t with the superscript k to note that the 
estimation will distinguish the value of total trade and food trade to allow for comparison 
between the two.   ௜ܻ௧ and ௝ܻ௧ are economic size represented by gross domestic product (GDP) of 
country i and country j at time t respectively.  ܼ௜௝ሺ௧ሻ௠  is a vector of observable trade cost or trade 
promotion which include bilateral distance, tariffs34 and five dummies denoting whether any of 
the country pair is landlocked country, shared border, shared common language, have colonial 
link and were colonized by the same country. 	ܹܶ ௜ܱ௝௧ and ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ are dummy variables take the 
value of 1 if the two countries are members of the WTO and if the two countries are ever in the 
same RTAs at time t, respectively, and take the value of 0 otherwise. ߝ௜௝௧ is error term. The 
standard independent variables in the gravity model and the expected signs are described in 
Table 4.3. The main interest in this study is the coefficient  ߛ and ߜ which show the estimation of 
the impact of WTO and RTA on members’ food trade, respectively.  
The use of unidirectional trade nominal value is to avoid typical mistakes in the gravity model 
because of averaging reciprocal trade flows and inappropriate deflation of trade flows (Baldwin 
and Taglioni, 2006).  Many gravity models work with the average of two way exports, i.e. 
average of country i imports from country j and country i export to country j. Baldwin and 
Taglioni show that unidirectional bilateral trade value is more theoretically well founded since 
                                                            
33 Unidirectional trade could be import of country i from country j or export of country i to country j, here import 
value is used. 
34  For total trade, total tariff is used. For food trade, an additional variable of food tariff/total trade is added in the 
specification. 
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the gravity model is a modified expenditure function which explains the value of spending by 
one country on the goods produced by another country.  
 
Table 4.3. Standard gravity independent variables and expected signs 
Independent Variables Descriptions Expected Signs 
Gross domestic product of the importer country i + 
Gross domestic product of the exporter country j + 
Geographical distance - 
Tariffs - 
Landlocked - 
Shared border + 
Common language + 
Colonial link + 
Common colony + 
 
There are several issues that need to be addressed related to the potential problems in estimating 
the standard gravity equation. First, sample selection bias which can be addressed by including 
importer and exporter specific fixed effects as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), and the 
equation can be written as:  
 
(2)  ௜ܺ௝௧௞ ൌ ∅௜ ൅ ∅௝ ൅ ∅௧ ൅ ߙଵ ௜ܻ௧ ൅ ߙଶ	 ௝ܻ௧ ൅ 	∑ ߚ௠ܼ௜௝ሺ௧ሻ௠ெ௠ୀଵ ൅ ߛ௔ܹܶ ௜ܱ௝௧ ൅ ߜ௡ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ ൅	ߝ௜௝௧ 
 
where ∅௜	, ∅௝ and 	∅௧ denote importer, exporter and time dummies respectively. All other 
variables are as described in the equation (1). 
Including importer and exporter specific fixed effects as in equation (2) can also address another 
potential problem related to relative trade cost or “multilateral trade resistance” as called by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). They emphasized that the propensity of trade between two 
countries is not simply determined by absolute trade cost between the two, but also on each 
country’s trade cost toward its partners relative to their partners in the rest of the world. For 
instance, relative trade cost between two countries surrounded by oceans is different from 
country pair surrounded by other exporting or importing countries. Ignoring multilateral trade 
resistance (MTRs) could lead to biased estimation results (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; 
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Feenstra, 2004). However, multilateral trade resistances are difficult to measure as they are not 
directly observable. Importer and exporter fixed effects are included to control all unobserved 
characteristic for both importer and exporter countries. 
 
In a panel setting, it is also possible to include time varying fixed effects to control all 
characteristic of importer and exporter countries that may vary over time. Including these 
importer and exporter time varying fixed effect yields the equation as the following:  
 
(3)          ௜ܺ௝௧௞ ൌ ∅௜௧ ൅ ∅௝௧ ൅	∅௧ ൅ ∑ ߚ௠ܼ௜௝ሺ௧ሻ௠ெ௠ୀଵ ൅ ߛ௔ܹܶ ௜ܱ௝௧ ൅ ߜ௡ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ ൅	ߝ௜௝௧ 
 
where ∅௜௧ is country i fixed effect at time t and ∅௝௧ is country j fixed effect at time t. Variables 
that are country and time specific, including importer and exporter GDP ( ௜ܻ௧ and ௝ܻ௧) are 
absorbed by ∅௜௧ and ∅௝௧. All other variables are as defined previously. 
Moreover, it may be the case that countries are likely to form trade agreements with their 
partners which already trade a lot which can lead to bias estimation results. To address this issue, 
we will use country-pair fixed effect which can rule out all unobserved bilateral characteristics 
between the pair countries. The equation including the country-pair fixed effect can be written 
as: 
(4)  ௜ܺ௝௧௞ ൌ ∅௜௝ ൅ ∅௧ ൅ ߙଵ ௜ܻ௧ ൅ ߙଶ	 ௝ܻ௧ ൅ 	∑ ߚ௠ܼ௜௝ሺ௧ሻ௠ெ௠ୀଵ ൅ ߛ௔ܹܶ ௜ܱ௝௧ ൅ ߜ௡ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ ൅	ߝ௜௝௧ 
 
where ∅௜௝ is country-pair fixed effect and ∅௧ is time effect. All other variables are as defined 
previously. 
Applying gravity model into a sector level of trade such as food is not entirely straightforward. 
The reason is that there are more differences between countries when one aims to analyze a 
specific sector. For instance, not all countries are categorized as food producers. These 
differences, however, can be well captured by including country specific fixed effects in the 
estimation.  Another consideration that needs to be specially addressed in analyzing sectoral 
trade is zero trade values. It is likely that zero trade values are more frequent when estimating 
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specific sector of trade. The use of logarithmic transformation in the standard gravity model 
creates immediate problem when trade value is zero, since log of zero is undefined. Omitting 
zero variables may result in bias estimation (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). As an alternative, 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro suggest to use Poisson Pseudo maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
estimator. They show that PPML provides robust estimation in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. PPML estimation can be estimated by solving the following first order 
condition: 
 
(5)       ∑ ሺܺ௣ െ exp൫ܼ௣ߚመ൯ሻ௣ ൌ 0 
 
where p denotes country pairs, ܺ௣	is unidirectional trade (i.e. imports) between the country pairs 
expressed in levels not in logarithms and ܼ௣	is the full vector of the gravity equation as defined 
in equation (1). 
 
4.6. Data Description 
Bilateral food and total trade data are derived from the United Nations Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database (UN COMTRADE) via World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). The 
definition of food uses standard product in the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC, 
revision 1) 0+1+22+4. Specifically it includes food and live animal, beverages and tobacco, oil 
seeds, oil nuts, oil kernels, animal and vegetable oils/fats.   
The database developed in this study consists of 162 countries around the globe over the period 
1991 – 2012 with three years intervals (1991, 1994, …, 2012). There are maximum 208656 
(162x161x8) observations with the number of zero trade observations are 90867 (43.5%) and 
144240 (69%) for total trade and food trade respectively.  
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Gross domestic product (GDP) in nominal US dollars comes from World Development 
Indicators35 of the World Bank.  Data on total tariffs and food tariffs come from Trade Analysis 
and Information system (TRAINS) database and derived via WITS36. Data on distance, 
landlocked, contiguous border, common language, colonial link and common colony are taken 
from Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). WTO database is 
the main source for data on WTO membership and regional trade agreements. There are 188 
RTAs included in the sample covering all regional trade agreements involving sample countries 
in the analysis that enter into force from 1960 to 2012. Countries’ level of development is 
represented by income level; high income countries is categorized as developed countries, 
middle and low income countries are categorized as developing countries. The levels of income 
are according to GNI per capita, taken from the World Bank database. 
 
4.7. Results Discussions 
The basic estimation results are presented in Table 4.4. The first estimation employs ordinary 
least squares (OLS) with time, importer and exporter fixed effects. On the total trade as 
dependent variable, all coefficients are statistically significant and show the correct signs as 
expected. Economic size (GDP) both importer and exporter positively impact total trade. Tariff, 
Distance and landlocked negatively impacts trade, while sharing border, language and colonial 
ties stimulate trade. For food trade, statistically significant coefficients are found for GDP 
importer, tariff, distance and shared border. Other variables are not statistically significant. Tariff 
is found positively impacts food trade while food tariff relative to total tariff is found statistically 
insignificant. 
The main interests of the estimation are the coefficients of WTO and RTAs that show to what 
extent both agreements, at the multilateral and regional levels, impact trade flow among 
participant countries. For total trade as dependent variable, the membership of the WTO results 
in a coefficient 0.216 that is positive and statistically significant; suggesting that trade among 
                                                            
35 In some cases, data are taken from national statistics to supplement World Bank data when it is missing or 
incomplete. 
36 When data on tariffs is missing in some years of a particular country, the tariffs of the nearest year is used and the 
earlier year comes at the first place. 
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WTO members is about 22 percent higher relative to non-members. The result for RTA 
membership is also positive and statistically significant with the coefficient 0.250, suggesting 
that joining RTA increase members’ trade about 25 percent on average compared to other 
countries trade without RTAs. The key question is whether WTO and RTAs have facilitated food 
trade among the participant countries. However, no statistically significant results are found from 
the estimations. the coefficient of WTO is negative (-0.0540) and the coefficient of RTAs is 
positive (0.0303), both are statistically insignificant. 
The results of the estimation when controlling for all characteristics of the importer and exporter 
that may vary over time by including time varying fixed effects do not change a lot from the 
previous estimation. Nearly all coefficients of the standard gravity model explanatory variables 
consistently show the same signs and significance level as in the previous estimation. Only tariff 
is much different but with the same sign with the previous specification with the coefficient of (-
0.102) and statistically significant at 1 percent. In this estimation, GDP importer and GDP 
exporter are absorbed by the time varying fixed effects. However, this does not really matter 
since our main interest is on the coefficient of WTO and RTA. We found the coefficient of the 
WTO is 0.231 which is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the WTO have 
increased trade among its member countries by 23 percent on average compared to non 
members. The coefficient of RTA is 0.169, positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
trade among RTA members is relatively 17 percent higher compared to countries without RTAs. 
For food trade, we found that the coefficient of tariff is statistically insignificant. All other 
variables are consistent with the previous specification in terms of signs and significance levels. 
The magnitudes of the coefficient are also not much different. For the variable of interests, like 
in the previous specification, the coefficient of WTO membership is negative (-0.0115) and 
statistically insignificant. However, RTAs is positive and statistically significant with coefficient 
0.115 which suggests that food trade among RTA members are relatively about 12 percent 
higher than non-members on average.   
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Table 4.4. Basic results of the gravity estimations 
 OLS (1)  OLS (2)  OLS (3)  PPML  
 Total Trade Food Trade  Total trade Food Trade  Total Trade Food Trade  Total Trade Food Trade 
GDP Importer  0.967*** 0.775***     1.002*** 0.830***  0.734*** 0.792*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0396)     (0.0265) (0.0403)  (0.0321) (0.0707) 
GDP Exporter  0.503*** -0.00963     0.526*** -0.0002  0.696*** 0.0527 
 (0.0287) (0.0358)     (0.0292) (0.0366)  (0.0315) (0.0409) 
Total Tariff  -0.0108* 0.0530***  -0.102*** 0.0174  -0.00650 0.0356***  0.00222 0.0090 
 (0.0058) (0.0097)  (0.0121) (0.0132)  (0.00573) (0.0099)  (0.00959) (0.0100) 
Food/Total Tariff   0.0067   -0.0032   0.0025   0.0002 
   (0.0127)   (0.0133)   (0.0131)   (0.0228) 
Distance  -1.600*** -0.329***  -1.613*** -0.317***       
 (0.0207) (0.0335)  (0.0208) (0.0340)       
Landlocked  -0.916*** 0.285  -2.068*** -0.301       
 (0.197) (0.348)  (0.330) (0.407)       
Shared Border  0.337*** 0.469***  0.333*** 0.463***       
 (0.113) (0.170)  (0.114) (0.173)       
Common Language  0.737*** 0.0663  0.747*** 0.0610       
 (0.0432) (0.0718)  (0.0434) (0.0727)       
Colonial Link  1.111*** -0.164  1.100*** -0.155       
 (0.102) (0.177)  (0.103) (0.183)       
Common Colony  0.948*** -0.0023  0.936*** -0.0126       
 (0.0557) (0.0882)  (0.0560) (0.0894)       
WTO  0.216*** -0.0540  0.231*** -0.0115  0.193*** -0.0489  0.108*** 0.108 
 (0.0264) (0.0366)  (0.0677) (0.111)  (0.0270) (0.0375)  (0.0299) (0.119) 
RTA  0.250*** 0.0303  0.169*** 0.115**  0.176*** -0.0380  0.0698** 0.223*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0466)  (0.0258) (0.0475)  (0.0266) (0.0567)  (0.0355) (0.0765) 
t dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
i and j dummies  Yes Yes  No No  No No  No No 
it and jt dummies  No No  Yes Yes  No No  No No 
ij dummies  No No  No No  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  117,789 64,416  117,789 64,416  117,789 64,416  178,128 116,856 
Number of pair id  22,266 14,607  22,266 14,607  22,266 14,607  22,266 14,607 
Note: All variables are in logarithm, except the dummies and the dependent variables in ppml estimations. Food/total tariff is the change of food tariff relative to total tariff. 
Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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In the estimations of OLS with bilateral country pair fixed effect to control for all unobserved 
country-pair characteristics, we found that both GDP importer and exporter positively impacts 
trade with the coefficient of 1.002 and 0.526 that are statistically significant. The coefficient of 
tariff is negative (-0.0065) but statistically insignificant and all other country-pair specific 
variables are absorbed by the country-pair fixed effects. For the variable of interests, the 
coefficient of WTO is 0.193, positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the WTO have 
increased trade among its member countries by 19 percent on average compared to non-
members. RTAs is also positive and statistically significant with coefficient 0.176 which 
suggests that food trade among RTA members are about 18 percent higher than non-members on 
average. For food trade, the two coefficients of WTO and RTAs are statistically insignificant. 
Further estimation of the gravity model employs Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
estimator. In this specification, bilateral country-pair fixed effect is used to control all 
unobserved bilateral country-pair characteristics. For total trade, GDP importer and GDP 
exporter are found positive and statistically significant as expected with the coefficient of 0.734 
and 0.696 respectively. For tariff, the coefficient is statistically insignificant, while all other 
country-pair specific variables are absorbed by the bilateral fixed effect. For food trade, as in the 
previous estimations using OLS, only GDP importer of the standard gravity variables that is 
found positive and statistically significant. For the variables of interest, the WTO and RTAs are 
positive and statistically significant for total trade with the coefficients of 0.108 and 0.0698 
respectively, suggesting that the trade of WTO members and RTAs members are higher about 11 
percent and 7 percent respectively compared to non-members. For food trade, the coefficient of 
WTO is found statistically insignificant, while RTA is positive and statistically significant with 
the coefficient of 0.223. 
The results show that nearly all signs and significance levels of the variables estimated are 
consistent with slightly different magnitudes in all different specifications. However, interesting 
result comes from tariff, especially for food trade, which shows positive sign suggesting that the 
increase of tariff increases food trade. The study further checks this result by estimating the 
effect of WTO and RTA membership on tariff. This is important since the purpose of trade 
agreements is basically to reduce trade barriers including through tariff reduction. Moreover, the 
test is conducted to find out whether higher tariff reduction in one sector such as food discourage 
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trade in other sector or vice versa. The effects of the WTO and RTAs on tariff are tested using 
three categories; total tariff, food tariff and food tariff relative to total tariff. On the third 
category, we divide the food tariff by total tariff to analyze the increase/reduction of food tariff 
relative to total tariff.  
Table 4.5. Impacts of WTO and RTAs on Tariff 
 Total Tariff Food Tariff 
Food Tariff/Total 
Tariff 
WTO 0.107*** 0.136*** -0.0289*** 
(0.00743) (0.00685) (0.00584) 
RTA -0.240*** -0.0727*** -0.168*** 
(0.0136) (0.0126) (0.0107) 
Total tariff is used for total trade and food tariff is used for food trade, both using 1+tariff specification. Time and bilateral 
country-pair effects are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
Only RTAs is found to have significantly reduced tariff and food tariff, while the WTO is found 
to have positive impacts on tariff. The results are not as expected and that are questioning the 
tariff reduction effects of the memberships of the WTO. On the food tariff relative to total tariff, 
we found negative signs for both WTO and RTAs. This indicates that the WTO and RTAs 
memberships result in higher food tariff reduction relative to total tariff. 
Further investigation is conducted to analyze possible asymmetries in trade agreements 
especially between developed and developing countries and countries in different regions. Since 
all specifications in the previous estimations show consistent results, the following estimations 
only employ PPML with considerations that addressing zero trade values in analyzing sector 
trade such as food is highly important. Bilateral country pair fixed effect is included in the 
estimation to control all unobserved variables that are country-pair specific.  
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Table 4.6. Results of developed and developing countries 
Total Trade Food Trade 
WTO both developed -0.189*** 0.0298 
(0.0408) (0.0884) 
WTO both developing 0.587*** 0.401*** 
(0.0711) (0.125) 
WTO developed and developing 0.161*** 0.0393 
(0.0374) (0.125) 
RTA both developed -0.0582 -0.0139 
(0.0656) (0.143) 
RTA both developing 0.141** 0.322 
(0.0714) (0.213) 
RTA developed and developing 0.0819* 0.235** 
(0.0468) (0.0932) 
Country-pair and Year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 178,128 116,856 
Number of pair id 22,266 14,607 
Note: variables included but not reported: gdp importer, gdp exporter and tariffs. Distance, landlocked, shared border, 
common language, common colony, colonial link are absorbed by the country-pair fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 4.7. Impacts of WTO in different regions 
Total Trade Food Trade 
WTO both Asia 0.0762 -0.327*** 
(0.0862) (0.108) 
WTO one Asia 0.170*** 0.102 
(0.0369) (0.0636) 
WTO both Africa 0.608*** 0.762*** 
(0.164) (0.202) 
WTO one Africa 0.160*** 0.0691 
(0.0577) (0.0828) 
WTO both America 0.0443 0.113 
(0.0891) (0.0978) 
WTO one America 0.202*** -0.0057 
(0.0643) (0.0831) 
WTO both Europe 0.122* 0.895*** 
(0.0675) (0.250) 
WTO one Europe (0.0354) 0.0028 
(0.0368) (0.0674) 
Country-pair and Year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 178,128 116,856 
Number of pair id 22,266 14,607 
Note: variables included but not reported: gdp importer, gdp exporter and tariffs. Distance, landlocked, shared border, 
common language, common colony, colonial link are absorbed by the country-pair fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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The results suggest that WTO negatively impacts trade when both countries are developed but 
positively impacts trade when trade involves developing countries. While for food trade, positive 
impacts are found when both counties are categorized as developing countries. RTAs are also 
found to have positive impacts when trade is between developed and developing countries or 
both parties are developing countries. The study found statistically insignificant effect of the 
RTAs on trade when both countries are developed countries. While for food trade, positive and 
statistically significant effect is found when food trade is between developed and developing 
country. 
From the estimation of the WTO based on regions, the WTO is found to have different impacts 
in different regions (Table 4.7). The highest positive impact of the WTO on trade is found for 
trade between African countries with the coefficient of 0.608. For food trade, the highest positive 
impact is found for food trade between European countries with the coefficient of 0.895. The 
results also indicate that food is traded more within a region rather that traded across regions.   
The study further analyses several specific RTAs around the globe (Table 4.8). RTAs analysed 
are selected from different continents to see their impacts on food trade. For Asia, this include 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and Pan Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA). In Africa, RTAs 
analyzed are Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) are taken for American countries, and European Union (EU) for Europe.  
COMESA, ECOWAS, EU, MERCOSUR and SADC are found to have positive impacts on trade 
among the members with ECOWAS being the highest with the coefficient of 1.608. Among 
these RTAs, only EU is found to also positively impacts food trade among its members with the 
coefficient of 0.940 which suggests that food trade among its members is about 94 percent higher 
compare to non-members. Another RTA that found to have positive impacts on food trade is 
NAFTA. However, no statistically significant result is found that NAFTA has also positive 
impacts on total trade among its members.   
 
 
88 
 
Table 4.8. Results of selected RTAs around the globe 
Total Trade Food Trade 
AFTA -0.117 0.456 
(0.224) (0.309) 
COMESA 1.183*** 0.455 
(0.377) (0.689) 
ECOWAS 1.608*** 1.168 
(0.485) (0.721) 
EU 0.170*** 0.940*** 
(0.0391) (0.0782) 
MERCOSUR 0.466*** -0.266* 
(0.141) (0.157) 
NAFTA 0.0628 3.177** 
(0.112) (1.324) 
PAFTA -0.197 -0.375 
(0.165) (0.246) 
SADC 1.045*** -0.148 
(0.404) (0.190) 
Country-pair and Year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 178,128 116,856 
Number of pair id 22,266 14,607 
Note: variables included but not reported: gdp importer, gdp exporter and tariffs. Distance, landlocked, shared border, 
common language, common colony, colonial link are absorbed by the country-pair fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
4.8. Conclusions 
The fast increase and excessive volatility of food prices in recent years are a significant 
indication of change in the global food market and a strong signal of resource scarcity (von 
Braun et al., 2014). Therefore, global food security is only possible when food can move freely 
from countries of surplus to countries of deficit and should not be prevented by international 
trade distortions.  
This chapter is questioning the contributions of the enormous number of trade agreements in the 
world trade system in strengthening food security at the worldwide level. The focus of the study 
is investigating whether trade agreements, both multilateral i.e. the WTO and at the regional 
level enhance food trade among the participant countries and bring the world into a freer flow of 
food.   
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Empirical results suggest that the multilateral and regional trade institutions indeed have 
delivered significant positive impacts on trade but not necessarily in the food sector. The 
findings suggest that only RTAs enhance food trade among their member countries whereas no 
evidences can be found that the WTO membership increase food trade among the members. 
Surprisingly, however, contrary to general believes where the WTO is often criticized by 
benefiting the developed countries more than the developing ones, we found that the WTO has 
facilitated trade as well as food trade of the developing countries more than of the developed 
ones. We found positive impacts of the WTO on trade when trade involves developing countries. 
The negative sign of trade between developed countries also indicates that the developed 
countries trade more with the developing countries than with the other developed ones. The 
results indicate that developing countries are more connected to the global trade than before. 
The findings also suggest that trade among countries is likely to have gone beyond only with 
traditional partners and beyond only with partner country in the same region. Food trade 
however, is still concentrated based on regions. The WTO is found to have stronger effects on 
food trade when the country-pair belongs to the same region than food trade between countries in 
different regions. The analysis on selected RTAs around the globe also supports the evidences.  
Trade agreements, both at multilateral and regional level, are intended to reduce trade barriers 
including through tariff elimination. However, the results suggest that no evidences can be found 
that the WTO has reduced tariffs among the member countries. Only RTAs are found to have 
reduced tariffs among the members. Nevertheless, the positive effects of the WTO on trade show 
that the cooperation in the multilateral trade institution is more than only reducing tariffs. The 
member countries seems to prefer trade more with other members compared to trade with non-
members even without tariff facilitation. On the other hand, no tariff reduction effect of the 
WTO on food trade confirms the findings that the food sector in the cooperation is still left 
behind. 
Stronger cooperation and coordination among countries is still needed to ensure the delivery of 
food to the people at all times in all places. The success of the Ninth Ministerial Meeting of the 
WTO which has delivered the Bali Package can be an important momentum in strengthening 
international trade cooperation at the multilateral level including in the food sector and bring the 
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world to a freer flow of food. Way forward is to ensure that the agreements can be implemented 
and bring benefits to global food security. 
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Chapter 5. General Conclusions  
 
In the current global economy that has been increasingly integrated, strengthening national 
policies alone is not sufficient to achieve more stable food prices. The two recent food price 
crises of 2008 and 2011 have shown evidences how markets between countries link with each 
other. Shocks in one part of the world spread easily to the other parts and disrupted the entire 
global food system.  
This dissertation discussed the cooperation among countries in ensuring food security and 
preventing food prices from excessive volatility with special focus on Indonesia. It included 
three levels of analytical inquiry: national, regional and global levels. The dissertation started by 
providing an analysis of food price dynamics in Indonesia and further continued with a review of 
the cooperation at the regional level to mitigate excessive food price volatility and an 
investigation on the potential of international and regional collaboration to enhance food trade. 
Indonesia provided an interesting case on the studies of cooperation and its relation to food price 
dynamics. The country is among the countries that experience high food price volatility as well 
as high risk of food and nutrition security. While the impact of food price volatility on food 
security is beyond the analysis of this study, ensuring affordable food prices to everyone in the 
country is highly important for Indonesia since the large part of its population are still living in 
poverty and are vulnerable to poverty. 
The results of the analysis showed that food price movements in terms of volatilities, spikes and 
trends in many different markets in Indonesia can be forecasted by focusing only on the key 
markets.  Using the concept of price transmission and market integration, the study found that 
food price movements in the 25 major markets in Indonesia for the period of 2000-2013 can be 
monitored by monitoring food price movements in Surabaya and Palangkaraya. The study also 
found that it is relevant to predict potential crisis using the information from the market price. 
Although the results indicated that not all alert phases of the two key markets lead to crises, 
monitoring price movements can help to better anticipate possible price crisis events in the 
country. In a large developing country such Indonesia, where markets are spread in many 
different islands, the results become important as it is possible to monitor price movements in the 
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country with few resources. Moreover, the approach can be useful in integrating policies in many 
different markets in Indonesia. In addition, Granger-causality test using Bangkok price as 
international market showed that price movements in 20 major markets in Indonesia follow price 
movements in the international markets. Thus, although international price movements cannot 
fully explain the price dynamics in all markets in Indonesia, monitoring international price 
movements can also be an alternative to forecast price movements in a lot of major markets in 
Indonesia. 
The study also found that cooperation at the regional level to pursue more stable food prices is 
possible. APTERR as a joint public reserve presents as a regional effort to face common 
challenges in ensuring food security. One of the main concerns of public reserve is that the cost 
is relatively high. This study showed that the cost of holding stocks can be reduced by 
cooperation. Simulations showed that regional cooperation significantly reduces the required 
stocks which will definitely reduce the costs of holding them. Adding transportation costs due to 
the decentralized storage in different countries still benefits member countries through fiscal cost 
reduction. 
At the global level, empirical results suggest that the multilateral and regional trade institutions 
have delivered significant positive impacts on trade but not on food sector. The findings suggest 
that only RTAs enhance food trade among their member countries whereas no evidence can be 
found that the WTO increases food trade among the members. Surprisingly, however, contrary to 
the general believes where the WTO is often criticized by benefiting the developed countries 
more than the developing ones, the study found that the WTO has facilitated trade as well as 
food trade of the developing countries more than of the developed countries. Yet, there are still 
asymmetries in the regional and multilateral trade agreements, between developed and 
developing countries and between countries in the different regions, especially in the food sector. 
These confirm that food sector is still a sensitive issue for many countries. 
The findings of this study reaffirm the importance of collaboration among countries in ensuring a 
sustainable level of food prices.  Despite that there are winners and losers in the agreements 
between countries, a compromise for mutual benefits still can be reached. Southeast Asian 
countries and their partners have shown that the cooperation at the regional level is possible. 
Moreover, the Bali Package, as the first agreement in the history of the WTO that was approved 
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by all member countries, is another example of cooperation at the global level, showing that 
mutual understandings can be found.  The cooperation may go further to the extent that brings 
benefits to all participants and can be effective in addressing the problems. Another most 
important point is to ensure that the agreements can be implemented in accordance to what have 
been agreed and can help to strengthen global food security.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.2.1. Summary statistics 
Market Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Banda Aceh 168 5476.87 2256.13 2552.45 9745.2 
Medan 168 5516.15 2130.11 2895 9387.17 
Padang 168 5918.94 2759.36 2751.46 12273.25 
Riau 168 5775.55 2576.28 2772.5 11310.25 
Jambi 168 5138.05 2349.91 2326.56 9712.17 
Palembang 168 5043.33 2257.42 2186.25 9210.83 
Bengkulu 168 5018.60 2095.20 2137.81 8699 
Bandar 
Lampung 168 5063.32 2367.07 2243.75 10037.33 
Jakarta 168 5802.56 2487.06 2724.29 10935 
Bandung 168 5118.59 2134.40 2311 8676 
Semarang 168 4994.76 2195.93 2272 8966.67 
Yogyakarta 168 4868.41 2221.75 2141.33 9026.4 
Surabaya 168 5068.46 2312.94 2255.31 9623 
Denpasar 168 5180.17 2202.66 2422.5 9370.75 
Mataram 168 4577.74 2072.31 1954.69 9091 
Kupang 168 5208.28 2180.96 2540.38 9754 
Pontianak 168 5515.88 2727.67 2437.5 10480.8 
Palangkaraya 168 6097.42 2892.92 2915 11465.91 
Banjarmasin 168 5412.18 3040.06 2279.36 11723.75 
Samarinda 168 5426.26 2379.46 2485.34 9999.25 
Manado 168 5243.97 2110.03 2741.67 8985.5 
Palu 168 4661.19 2053.29 2016.67 8183.8 
Makassar 168 4491.90 1840.41 2193.75 7739.5 
Kendari 168 4832.60 2174.21 1817.81 8538.17 
Jayapura 168 6183.77 2410.93 3100 10633.67 
Source: own calculation based on BPS database 
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Table A.2.2. Population and Poor Population per Province in Indonesia 2014 (000) 
Province Population Poor Population % 
Aceh 4930.659 837.42 16.98 
Sumatera Utara 13808.442 1360.60 9.85 
Sumatera Barat 5149.075 354.74 6.89 
Riau 6235.294 498.28 7.99 
Jambi 3359.111 281.75 8.39 
Sumatera Selatan 7969.898 1085.80 13.62 
Bengkulu 1852.024 316.50 17.09 
Lampung 8048.412 1143.93 14.21 
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung 1353.652 67.23 4.97 
Kepulauan Riau 1940.242 124.17 6.40 
DKI Jakarta 10103.494 412.79 4.09 
Jawa Barat 46196.846 4238.96 9.18 
Jawa Tengah 33582.041 4561.83 13.58 
DI Yogyakarta 3661.028 532.59 14.55 
Jawa Timur 38665.763 4748.42 12.28 
Banten 11775.682 649.19 5.51 
Bali 4120.698 195.95 4.76 
Nusa Tenggara Barat 4789.434 816.62 17.05 
Nusa Tenggara Timur 5059.695 991.88 19.60 
Kalimantan Barat 4734.718 381.92 8.07 
Kalimantan Tengah 2453.75 148.83 6.07 
Kalimantan Selatan 3938.794 189.50 4.81 
Kalimantan Timur 4005.566 252.68 6.31 
Sulawesi Utara 2392.301 197.56 8.26 
Sulawesi Tengah 2844.448 387.06 13.61 
Sulawesi Selatan 8452.463 806.35 9.54 
Sulawesi Tenggara 2460.512 314.09 12.77 
Gorontalo 1120.513 195.10 17.41 
Sulawesi Barat 1284.199 154.69 12.05 
Maluku 1665.304 307.02 18.44 
Maluku Utara 1144.254 84.79 7.41 
Papua Barat 858.495 225.46 26.26 
Papua 3107.987 864.11 27.80 
Indonesia 253064.794 27727.78 10.96 
Source: Statistics Indonesia, 2014.  
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Table A.3.1. Correlation of supply shortfalls from target consumption of 97% 
BRN  KHM  IDN  LAO  MYS  MMR  PHL  SGP  THA  VNM  CHN  JPN  KOR 
BRN  1 
KHM  ‐0.0124  1 
IDN  ‐0.1529  0.0534  1 
LAO  ‐0.0805  ‐0.0614  0.3666*  1 
MYS  0.1322  0.1505  0.0084  0.15  1 
MMR  ‐0.2106  0.0689  0.1542  0.1115  0.6032* 1 
PHL  0.0871  ‐0.0514  ‐0.0697  0.0825  0.0027  ‐0.1111  1 
SGP  ‐0.1477  0.3081  ‐0.1211  ‐0.1792  ‐0.1117  ‐0.1291  0.0638  1 
THA  ‐0.1184  ‐0.1699  0.0066  0.0013  ‐0.0322  ‐0.0356  0.4060*  0.3721*  1 
VNM  ‐0.1455  ‐0.1263  ‐0.0643  ‐0.1139  ‐0.0923  ‐0.1028  ‐0.0728  0.0142  0.0815  1 
CHN  0.4617*  ‐0.0895  ‐0.0635  ‐0.1097  0.2073  ‐0.0577  ‐0.072  0.0488  0.1212  ‐0.0664  1 
JPN  0.0248  ‐0.0494  0.224  0.5026* ‐0.0518  ‐0.1373  ‐0.0028  ‐0.1397  ‐0.0782  ‐0.0897  0.2056  1 
KOR  0.2939  0.0595  ‐0.0642  ‐0.0528  0.5680* 0.109  ‐0.0374  ‐0.194  ‐0.1071  ‐0.1088  0.5560* 0.0391  1 
Note: BRN (Brunei Darussalam), KHM (Cambodia), IDN (Indonesia), LAO (Lao PDR), MYS (Malaysia, MMR (Myanmar), PHL (Philippines), SGP (Singapore), THA (Thailand), 
VNM (Vietnam), CHN (China), JPN (Japan), KOR (Rep. Korea). * represents significance level at 5 percent. 
Source: Own calculation based on USDA PSD 
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Table A.3.2. Rice supply, consumption and shortfall 1980-2014 
 Supply Consumption Shortfall 
 
annual 
average  
(000 tons) 
regional share  
(%) 
annual 
average   
(000 tons) 
regional share 
(%) 
number  of 
shortfall 
maximum 
shortfall  
(000 tons) 
mean of 
shortfall  
(000 tons) 
ASEAN        
Brunei 31.7 0.01 31.71 0.01 14 7.36 1.27 
Cambodia 2494.63 0.80 2213.09 1.00 9 286.61 36.52 
Indonesia 37250.69 11.94 32765.20 14.84 3 344.48 15.57 
Lao PDR 1089.40 0.35 1057.20 0.48 9 113.47 11.35 
Malaysia 2327.60 0.75 1926.37 0.87 7 107.68 6.92 
Myanmar 10019.80 3.21 8751.66 3.96 7 207.31 19.50 
Philippines 10958.83 3.51 8685.11 3.93 6 470.13 23.72 
Singapore 271.86 0.09 268.60 0.12 11 62.52 7.09 
Thailand 18737.71 6.01 9079.97 4.11 6 780.79 66.28 
Vietnam 19028.09 6.10 15135.54 6.85 3 819 39.41 
Plus Three        
China 191979.50 61.56 126655.20 57.35 4 4069.61 180.69 
Japan 11315.51 3.63 9118.14 4.13 7 793.68 50.65 
Rep. Korea 6352.40 2.04 5171.37 2.34 6 358.73 41.60 
Total 311857.73 100 220859.17 100 92 8422.30 500.57 
Regional 311857.73 100 220859.17 100 31 4725.21 506.43 
Note: Regional refers to ASEAN plus three countries as a region 
Source: Own calculation based on USDA PSD 
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Table A.4.1. List of sample countries 
Albania (WTO, 2000)  
Algeria (Non WTO)  
Antigua and Barbuda (WTO, 1995)  
Argentina (WTO, 1995)            
Armenia (WTO, 2003)       
Australia (WTO, 1995) 
Austria (WTO, 1995) 
Azerbaijan (Non WTO) 
Bahamas, The (Non WTO) 
Bahrain (WTO, 1995)                     
Bangladesh (WTO, 1995)                      
Barbados (WTO, 1995) 
Belarus (Non WTO)                       
Belgium (WTO, 1995) 
Belize (WTO, 1995)                           
Benin (WTO, 1996) 
Bhutan (Non WTO) 
Bolivia (WTO, 1995) 
Botswana (WTO, 1995)                          
Brazil (WTO, 1995)               
Brunei Darussalam (WTO, 1995)                 
Bulgaria (WTO, 1996) 
Burkina Faso (WTO, 1995) 
Burundi (WTO, 1995)                        
Cambodia (WTO, 2004)                        
Cameroon (WTO,  1995)                        
Canada (WTO, 1995)                      
Cape Verde (WTO, 2008) 
Central African Rep. (WTO, 1995) 
Chad (WTO, 1996) 
Chile (WTO, 1995) 
China (WTO, 2001) 
Colombia (WTO, 1995) 
Comoros (Non WTO)                    
Congo, Rep. (WTO, 1997)                    
Costa Rica (WTO, 1995)                   
Cote d'Ivoire (WTO, 1995)                       
Croatia (WTO, 2000) 
Cyprus (WTO, 1995) 
Czech Republic (WTO, 1995)  
Denmark (WTO, 1995) 
Dominica (WTO, 1995) 
Dominican Rep. (WTO, 1995) 
Ecuador (WTO, 1996) 
Egypt, Arab Rep. (WTO, 1995)                  
El Salvador (WTO, 1995) 
Ethiopia (Non WTO)                           
Fiji (WTO, 1996)                         
Finland (WTO, 1995)   
France (WTO, 1995)                   
Gabon (WTO, 1995) 
Gambia, The (WTO, 1996) 
Georgia (WTO, 2000) 
Germany (WTO, 1995)   
Ghana (WTO, 1995) 
Greece (WTO, 1995)                     
Grenada (WTO, 1996)          
Guatemala (WTO, 1995)          
Guinea (WTO, 1995)        
Guinea-Bissau (WTO, 1995)                   
Guyana (WTO, 1995)     
Honduras (WTO, 1995) 
Hungary (WTO, 1995)      
Iceland (WTO, 1995)       
India (WTO, 1995)                           
Indonesia (WTO, 1995)   
Iran, Islamic Rep. (Non WTO) 
Ireland (WTO, 199) 
Israel (WTO, 1995)   
Italy (WTO, 1995)     
Jamaica (WTO, 1995)    
Japan (WTO, 1995)            
Jordan (WTO, 2000) 
Kazakhstan (Non WTO)  
Kenya (WTO, 1995)        
Kiribati (Non WTO)     
Korea, Rep. (WTO, 1995)           
Kuwait (WTO, 1995) 
Kyrgyz, Rep. (WTO, 1998)     
Latvia (WTO, 1998)   
Lebanon (Non WTO) 
Lesotho (WTO, 1995)       
Lithuania (WTO, 2001) 
Luxembourg (WTO, 1995) 
Macedonia (Non WTO)        
Madagascar (WTO, 1995) 
Malawi (WTO, 1995)  
Malaysia (WTO, 1995)        
Maldives (WTO, 1995) 
Mali (WTO, 1995)       
Malta (WTO, 1995) 
Mauritania (WTO, 1995)       
Mauritius (WTO, 1995) 
Mexico (WTO, 1995) 
Moldova (WTO, 2001) 
Mongolia (WTO, 1997)      
Morocco (WTO, 1995)       
Mozambique (WTO, 1995)     
Namibia (WTO, 1995) 
Nepal (WTO, 2004)  
Netherlands (WTO, 1995)   
New Zealand (WTO, 1995) 
Nicaragua (WTO, 1995)  
Niger (WTO, 1996)   
Nigeria (WTO, 1995)  
Norway (WTO, 1995)    
Oman (WTO, 2000) 
Pakistan (WTO, 1995) 
Palau (Non WTO) 
Panama (WTO, 1997)           
Papua New Guinea (WTO, 1996) 
Paraguay (WTO, 1995) 
Peru (WTO, 1995)   
Philippines (WTO, 1995)      
Poland (WTO, 1995)     
Portugal (WTO, 1995)    
Qatar (WTO, 1996) 
Romania (WTO, 1995) 
Russian Federation (WTO, 2012) 
Rwanda (WTO, 1996) 
Samoa (WTO, 2012) 
Saudi Arabia (WTO, 2005)   
Senegal (WTO, 1995)     
Seychelles (Non WTO)                     
Sierra Leone (WTO, 1995)                 
Singapore (WTO, 1995) 
Slovakia (WTO, 1995)        
Slovenia (WTO, 1995)      
Solomon Islands (WTO, 1996)    
South Africa (WTO, 1995)     
Spain (WTO, 1995) 
Sri Lanka (WTO, 1995) 
St. Lucia (WTO, 1995) 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
(WTO, 1995) 
Sudan (Non WTO) 
Suriname (WTO, 1995) 
Swaziland (WTO, 1995) 
Sweden (WTO, 1995) 
Switzerland (WTO, 1995)   
Syrian Arab Rep. (Non WTO) 
Tajikistan (WTO, 2013) 
Tanzania (WTO, 1995)  
Thailand (WTO, 1995) 
Togo (WTO, 1995)  
Tonga (WTO, 2007)  
Trinidad & Tobago (WTO, 1995)  
Tunisia (WTO, 1995) 
Turkey (WTO, 1995) 
Turkmenistan (Non WTO) 
Tuvalu (Non WTO)  
Uganda (WTO, 1995) 
Ukraine (WTO, 2008)  
United Arab Emirates (WTO, 
1996) 
United Kingdom (WTO, 1995)  
United States (WTO, 1995)         
Uruguay (WTO, 1995)    
Vanuatu (WTO, 2012)     
Venezuela, RB (WTO, 1995) 
Vietnam (WTO, 2007)   
Yemen, Rep. (Non WTO)  
Zambia (WTO, 1995) 
Zimbabwe (WTO, 1995) 
Note: WTO memberships including year of joining and level of income are in parentheses 
Source: WTO database 
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Table A.4.2. List of sample regional trade agreements 
EFTA (1960) 
CACM (1961) 
PACTRA (1977) 
SPARTECA (1981) 
LAIA (1981) 
ANZCERTA (1983) 
US-Israel (1985) 
CAN (1988) 
GSTP (1989) 
MERCOSUR (1991) 
ASEAN/AFTA (1992) 
ECO (1992) 
EFTA-Turkey (1992) 
European Union (1993) 
EFTA-Israel (1993) 
Russia-Azerbaijan (1993) 
Russia-Turkmenistan 
(1993) 
Russia-Tajikistan (1993) 
Russia-Belarus (1993) 
Kyrgyz, Rep-Russia (1993) 
Russia-Kazakhstan (1993) 
ECOWAS (1993) 
MSG (1994) 
NAFTA (1994) 
Ukraine-Russia (1994) 
Georgia-Russia (1994) 
COMESA (1994) 
CIS (1994) 
Colombia-Mexico (1995) 
Ukraine-Turkmenistan 
(1995) 
Kyrgyz, Rep.-Kazakhstan 
(1995) 
SAPTA (1995) 
EU-Turkey (1996) 
Georgia-Ukraine (1996) 
Georgia-Azerbaijan (1996) 
Ukraine-Azerbaijan (1996) 
Canada-Israel (1997) 
Turkey-Israel (1997) 
Canada-Chile (1997) 
EAEC (1997) 
Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan 
(1997) 
PAFTA (1998) 
Kyrgyz-Ukraine (1998) 
EU-Tunisia (1998) 
Ukraine-Kazakhstan (1998) 
CEMAC (1999) 
Georgia-Kazakhstan (1999) 
Chile-Mexico (1999) 
EFTA-Morocco (1999) 
Georgia-Turkmenistan 
(2000) 
WAEMU (2000) 
EU-South Africa (2000) 
EU-Morocco (2000) 
EU-Israel (2000) 
EU-Mexico (2000) 
Israel-Mexico (2000)  
EAC (2000) 
SADC 2000) 
Turkey-Macedonia (2000) 
New Zealand-Singapore 
(2001) 
EU-Macedonia (2001) 
EFTA-Mexico (2001) 
Ukraine-Macedonia (2001) 
Dominican  Rep.-Central 
America (2001) 
India-Sri Lanka (2001) 
US-Jordan (2001) 
APTA-China (2002) 
Chile-Costa Rica (2002) 
EFTA-Macedonia (2002) 
EU-Jordan (2002) 
Chile-El Salvador (2002) 
Ukraine-Tajikistan (2002) 
EFTA-Jordan (2002) 
Canada-Costa Rica (2002) 
Japan-Singapore (2002) 
EFTA-Singapore (2003) 
GCC (2003) 
EU-Chile (2003) 
EU-Lebanon (2003) 
Panama-El Salvador (2003) 
PICTA (2003) 
Singapore-Australia (2003) 
US-Chile (2004) 
US-Singapore (2004) 
Korea-Chile (2004) 
CEZ (2004)  
EU-Egypt (2004) 
Mexico-Uruguay (2004) 
SACU (2004) 
EFTA-Chile (2004) 
ASEAN-China (2005) 
US-Australia (2005) 
Thailand-Australia (2005) 
Japan-Mexico (2005) 
Ukraine-Moldova (2005) 
EFTA-Tunisia (2005) 
Pakistan-Sri Lanka (2005) 
Turkey-Tunisia (2005) 
Thailand-New Zealand 
(2005) 
India-Singapore (2005) 
Jordan-Singapore (2005) 
EU-Algeria (2005) 
SAFTA (2006) 
US-Morocco (2006) 
Turkey-Morocco (2006) 
CAFTA_DR (2006) 
Korea-Singapore (2006) 
TPSEP (2006) 
Japan-Malaysia (2006) 
Panama-Singapore (2006) 
India-Bhutan (2006) 
US-Bahrain (2006) 
EFTA-Korea (2006) 
Chile-China (2006) 
Ukraine-Belarus (2006) 
EU-Albania (2006) 
EFTA-Lebanon (2007) 
Turkey-Syria (2007) 
Egypt-Turkey (2007) 
Pakistan-China (2007) 
EFTA-Egypt (2007) 
Chile-India (2007) 
Chile-Japan (2007) 
Japan-Thailand (2007) 
Pakistan-Malaysia (2008) 
Panama-Chile (2008) 
Turkey-Albania (2008) 
EFTA-SACU (2008) 
Japan-Indonesia (2008) 
Chile-Honduras (2008) 
Brunei-Japan (2008) 
China-New Zealand (2008) 
EU-CARIFORUM (2008) 
Turkey-Georgia (2008) 
Panama-Costa Rica (2008) 
ASEAN-Japan (2008) 
Japan-Philippines (2008) 
EU-Cote d’Ivoire (2009) 
China-Singapore (2009) 
US-Oman (2009) 
Panama-Honduras (2009) 
US-Peru (2009) 
Peru-Chile (2009) 
Australia-Chile (2009) 
Chile-Colombia (2009) 
MERCOSUR-India (2009) 
Panama-Guatemala (2009) 
EFTA-Canada (2009) 
Canada-Peru (2009) 
Peru-Singapore (2009) 
Japan-Switzerland (2009) 
Japan-Vietnam (2009) 
EU-Cameroon (2009) 
India-Nepal (2009) 
Colombia-Northern 
Triangle (2009) 
Panama-Nicaragua (2009) 
EU-PNG (2009) 
ASEAN-Korea (2010) 
ASEAN-India (2010) 
AANZFTA (2010) 
Korea-India (2010) 
Peru-China (2010) 
Chile-Guatemala (2010) 
New Zealand-Malaysia 
(2010) 
EFTA-Albania (2010) 
Turkey-Jordan (2011) 
Turkey-Chile (2011) 
EU-Korea (2011) 
India-Japan (2011) 
India-Malaysia (2011) 
EFTA-Peru (2011) 
EFTA-Colombia (2011) 
China-Costa Rica (2011) 
Peru-Korea (2011) 
Canada-Colombia (2011) 
Peru-Mexico (2012) 
Chile-Malaysia (2012) 
Japan-Peru (2012) 
Korea-US (2012) 
Panama-Peru (2012) 
EU-EPA (2012) 
US-Colombia (2012) 
EFTA-Ukraine (2012) 
Mexico-Central America 
(2012) 
Canada-Jordan (2012) 
Chile-Nicaragua (2012) 
US-Panama (2012)  
Note: Years of entry into force are in parentheses, the analysis takes into account different years of joining of some 
member countries into the agreement but their years of joining are not shown in the table to save space, further 
information can be found at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx    
Source: WTO database  
 
